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FEDERAL PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
WITHIN TRADE UNIONS
RICHARD A. GIVENS*
The "Bil of Rights" provisions of the Labor-Managemnct Reporting anld Dis-
closure Act of 1959 are designed to guarantee and protect employee repre-
sentation in Industrial government. The author, pointing to the method of
Mr. Chief Jzstice Stone in Steele v. Louisvile & N.R.R., suggests that thc
act's purposes oay be advanced by an interpretation guided by the constiit-
tional precedents applicable to public government.
Events of the last few years, including the adoption of ethical prac-
tices codes by the AFL-CIO, the expulsion of the Teamsters, the revela-
tions during congressional hearings of improper practices by unions and
employers, and finally the enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act,' illus-
trate a ferment in the framework of employee representation in "in-
dustrial government."'2
This ferment reflects the national concern with the persistent problem
of reconciling individual rights and the public interest with the vast
powers concentrated in government, business enterprises, trade unions,
and other centers of decision-making in industrial society. One way of
attempting to deal with the ferment caused by concentrated power and
the criticisms it raises has been to concentrate all power in a monolithic
State and to seek to suppress all criticism, as under Communist and
Fascist dictatorships. A second theoretically possible approach, now
foreclosed by the competition of the dictatorships, would be to atomize
the major centers of concentrated power. ' A third course is to evolve
standards for the exercise of power and to provide representation in the
making of decisions to those affected by them, while still preserving the
vital functions performed by the institutions exercising the concentrated
power. It is this course to which the American nation has been
committed.
The underlying problem of concentrated power affects the question
of the obligations of trade unions toward the employees they represent.
The ultimate course of the evolution in this field will be decided by
employees, union leaders, employers and the public. But the courts,
by enforcing minimum legal standards of conduct and by illustrating
Member of the New York Bar.
1. Labor-MIanagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29 US.C.
§§ 401-531 (Supp. I, 1959).
2. See Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 3G-12 (1924); ef. Common5 ct al,
Industrial Government (1921).
3. See Brandeis, J., dissenting in Louis K. Ligaett Co. v. Lve, 2,3 U.S. 517, 541-So
(1933); Comment, 66 Yale L.J. 69 (1956).
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in concrete cases what is fair and just, may profoundly influence the
judgments of these groups as to what should be done.' This article will
seek to explore some of the legal standards which may assist or hinder
this evolution.
The bill of rights included in the 1959 labor statute is of immense
importance as a national decision that "the rights and interests of
employees"5 be given greater protection. In its recognition that the
power to bargain collectively must carry with it the legal obligation to
respect the interests of the employees for whom the unions bargain,
however, the statute was anticipated by fifteen years by the historic
decision of Mr. Chief Justice Stone in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.
The statute, therefore, cannot be viewed in isolation. It does not purport
to be exclusive,7 and prior decisions and their implications must be
utilized to throw light upon its ambiguities.
Our inquiry, therefore, shall begin with the historic problems which
brought the Steele case before the Court, and with Chief Justice Stone's
resolution of those problems.
I. THE STEELE CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
A. The Challenge of the Facts in Their Historic Setting
Modern trade unionism is in part the outcome of the increasing size of
economic units, vesting in an employer employing many workmen a far
greater bargaining power than possessed by the individual employee,8
and of the extension of markets, which tended to make the working
conditions in one plant dependent on conditions in other plants. Em-
ployees became convinced that wages, hours and working conditions
could be improved if the balance of bargaining power could be equalized.'
Further, the individual employee felt no protection against arbitrary
action by his supervisors. Through collective bargaining and representa-
tion in presenting grievances, trade unions sought to protect the em-
4. See Jones, Book Review, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 755, 758 (1958).
5. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 2, 73 Stat. $19, 29
U.S.C. § 401(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
6. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
7. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 §§ 103, 603, 73 Stat. 523,
540, 29 U.S.C. §§ 413, 523 (Supp. I, 1959).
8. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
9. The result might also differ from that which would occur if neither employer nor
employee had substantial bargaining power, as is assumed in models of an economic system
based upon the presupposition of pure competition, where no buyer or seller of goods or
services can influence the effective market price. A detailed analysis of the effect of col-
lective bargaining upon wages and employment is, however, beyond the scope of the
present article.
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ployee's right to his job' ° and to give him a voice in his "industrial
government."
As enterprises grew in size and expanding transportation and com-
munication facilities extended markets,1 trade unions were forced to
make decisions affecting larger and larger numbers of workers in order
to bargain effectively," since, if one plant paid lower wages than a
competing plant, the higher paying plant, unless more efficient, would
be under pressure to cut the union scale or lose business. But the in-
creasing size of the decision-making units made the individual em-
ployee's participation in those decisions more difficult. Accordingly, the
risk increased that the concentrated power of the union might be used
less responsively to his needs, or that he would never secure a real voice
in his "industrial government."' 3 Indeed, the concentrated power of the
union might even be used against him, as where "sweetheart contracts"
are entered into by corrupt leaders, or payoffs extorted for the benefit
of the leader.
In many ways the legal responses to trade unions have paralleled
those to business corporations. At first corporate power was feared and
its growth restricted,'4 but gradual recognition of the usefulness of
the corporate form led to encouragement of the growth of the large enter-
prises existing today. However, experience showed that these large or-
ganizations acquired tremendous bargaining power as compared with that
of their employees, their customers and others; that they often became
independent of the control of their original sponsors, the stockholders;'0
and that, in some cases, those in control engaged in self-dealing for their
own benefit.' Accordingly, legal standards were developed to insure
fairness in the exercise of corporate power.'7 Trade unions themselves
10. Compare Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Ilovement (1923).
11. See Commons, American Shoemakers, 1643-1.95, in Labor and Adminvtration 219
(1913), and sea also Thorp, Economic Institutions 93-93 (1923). Judicial rcc,3gnition
of the extension of markets as reflected in a tremendous increase in the importanc of
interstate commerce is manifested in United States v. Women's Sportswear ffriL ,-nz; 336
U.S. 460, 464 (1949) ; wichard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. ill (1942) ; and Unitcd Statea v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941). Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1913); Unitcd State5
v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
12. Compare Dulles, Labor in America 9.-lC0 (1949); Lip:ct, Trow & Cokman,
Union Democracy 19 (1956); Rose, The Relationship of the Local Union to the Interna-
tional Organization, 4 Labor Lj. 334 (1953).
13. See Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy 54 (1959).
14. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 223 U.S. 517, 543-64 (1933) (Brandd, Jo, dLz-mt-
ing).
15. See Berle & Mleans, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
16. See the protest of Stone, J., dissenting in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 2,13 U.S.
123, 133-50 (1933).
17. E.g., labor legislation, the antitrust laws, securities regulation, and egecific eiatute3
19601
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were an important response to this problem, along with the later im-
position upon corporations of the legal duty to bargain collectively.
Another response was the promotion of free and active competition
through the antitrust laws.
Similarly, trade unions were originally condemned as illegal con-
spiracies. 8 But we have learned that unions frequently are vital for
the protection of employees' welfare, counterbalancing the power of
employers whose bargaining position would otherwise overshadow that
of the individual employee. 10 Accordingly, the right to organize20 and
bargain collectively, and in many cases to engage in strikes and picket-
ing,2' has been given protection by federal law. In order to make col-
lective bargaining effective, both the Railway Labor Act22 and the
National Labor Relations Act grant to a union representing a majority
of the employees in an appropriate unit the exclusive authority to
bargain collectively on behalf of all employees within the unit2 ' and
place a duty on the employer to deal with that bargaining agent. The
Supreme Court has further strengthened this concept by holding that
collective bargaining agreements supersede individual employment con-
tracts to the extent of any inconsistency.24 But, as with all power in
affecting particular industries, as well as the development of common law doctrines such
as manufacturers' liability.
18. E.g., Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case, Commonwealth v. Pullis (1806), as reported
in 3 Commons & Gilmore, Documentary History of American Industrial Society 59-236
(1910-1911).
19. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958); cf. Galbraith, American Capitalism (2d ed. 1956)
(discussing the concept of "countervailing power").
20. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
21. See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Amalgamated Ass'n of St.,
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S.
383 (1951). See also Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-
15 (1958); cf. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
22. 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1958). The provisions of the NLRA are
clearer, but those of the RLA have been held to achieve the same result. Virginian Ry. v.
System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
23. Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment. . . ." 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended,
61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958). See also Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective
Bargaining, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 556 (1945). A proviso in § 9(a) deals with the right of an
individual employee to present a grievance directly to his employer.
24. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (under the NLRA); Order of R.R.
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the hands of any group, 5 the concentrated authority of unions could
not prove immune to abuse. The gradual process of seeking to formulate
fair standards for the exercise of this power, as in the case of business
corporations, has been made more difficult, on one side, by attempts to
impose punitive rather than corrective restrictions, and, on the other,
by the blanket resistance to all corrective measures which such attempts
always excite.-
It was in this context that the facts of the Steele case arose.? Since
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen was selected
by a majority of the employees in its crafts as exclusive bargaining
agent, the railroads were required by the Railway Labor Act to bargain
with it exclusively as to the condition of employment of all members of
the crafts. The Brotherhood, refusing to admit Negro employees to
membership, negotiated an agreement which, while it did not refer to
Negroes specifically, would effectively oust them from their jobs. -2
Thus, far from representing these employees so as to assure that the
economic power of the employer was exercised with fairness toward
them, the bargaining agent refused them an opportunity to take part in
its decisions and even acted adversely to their interests. Steele, a Negro
employee of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, sought to enjoin the
performance of the agreement in the Alabama state courts, which held
that the Railway Labor Act, while making the Brotherhood exclusive
bargaining agent, did not impose any duties upon it which would preclude
it from making the challenged agreement."
The case presented a difficult legal problem, for, as Mr. Justice
M1urphy pointed out in his concurring opinion, "The Act contains no
Telegraphers v. Railway E.press Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (iP44) (RLo)L S aL9
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 633-S4 (1944) (NLRA); Nirgi nan
Ry. v. System Fed'n, 3CO U.S. 515, 54S (1937) (RLA).
25. Compare Hamilton, Legal Tolerance of Economic Power, 46 Geo. L J. 561 (1953);
cf. Johnson, American Heroes and Hero Worship 20 (1941); Jaffe, The Right to Judicial
Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rex. 401, 404 (1953).
26. Cf. Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 895, a13 (1951).
27. See the Court's statement of facts, 323 U.S. at 194-97. For an interezting discdion
of the factual background of the Steele case and related litigation, see Comment, Judicial
Regulation of the Railway Brotherhoods' Discriminatory Practicc, 1953 Wis. L. ReV. 516,
518-20. See generally Bromwich, Union Constitutions 6-7 (1959); Northrup, Organized
Labor and the Negro (1944); Jacobs, The Negro Worker and His Rights, The Reporter,
July 23, 1959, p. 16; Summers, Admission Policies of Labor Unions, 61 QJ. Econ. 66
(1946).
28. "By established practice on the several railroads ... only white firemen can be
promoted to serve as engineers, and the notice proposed that only 'promotable,' i.e. white,
men should be employed as firemen or assigned to new runs or jobs or permanent vacancie3
in established runs or jobs." 323 U.S. at 195.
29. 245 Ala. 113, 16 So. 2d 416 (1944).
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language which directs the manner in which the bargaining representa-
tive shall perform its duties. ' 30  It might have been easy to write a
decision saying that we take the statute as we find it, and since the
Railway Act contains no provisions which in terms impose on the bar-
gaining representative duties to Steele and those in his position, it was
not for the courts to impose them.3 Whether the Brotherhood should
be permitted to act as it did could have been characterized as a question
of policy-making which was not the function of the Court to resolve.
This, then, was the challenge which faced Chief Justice Stone when
Steele, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Brotherhood argued
their rival claims before the Court in November 1944.
B. Chief Justice Stone's Decision
Although Steele asserted that the discrimination against him was
unconstitutional, earlier decisions had firmly held that the limitations
of the Bill of Rights and of the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment applied only to governmental and not to
private action.3" However, an emerging line of decisions had already
established, by 1944, that a private group exercising a public function
must be held to the constitutional standards applicable to state actionY0
In other words, the state could not accomplish indirectly, through dele-
gating its authority to a private group, what would be forbidden if done
directly. Since the Brotherhood exercised important powers over those
it represented by virtue of the act, Chief Justice Stone was able to write
in strict accord with precedent:
If, as the state court has held, the Act confers this power on the bargaining rcpre-
sentative of a craft or class of employees without any commensurate statutory duty
toward its members, constitutional questions arise.
3 4
30. 323 U.S. at 208.
31. But see 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 77(5), at 217-21
(1940).
32. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). But see Harlan, J., dissenting In the
Civil Rights Cases, supra, at 26, 57-59; Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
262-63 (1908); Hale, Force and the State, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 149 (1935).
33. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)
(Cardozo, J.). For subsequent developments see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517
(1946); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945); Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.S.C.
1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949); cf. Miller, Racial Discrimination and Private
Education: A Legal Analysis 82-92 (1957); Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate
Activity-Protection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100
U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 948-49 (1952); Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 344, 352 (1948).
34. 323 U.S. at 198.
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Chief justice Stone earlier had called for greater recognition of "stat-
utes as starting points for judicial law-making comparable to judicial
decisions," to be treated as "both a declaration and a source of law, and
as a premise for legal reasoning."5 'When forced now to search for a
constitutional interpretation30 of the Railway Labor Act, he began with
the statute itself. By its creation of a bargaining representative, he
found that, by implication, the statute also imposed a duty of fairness
upon that representative:
The purpose of providing for a representative is to secure those benefits for those
who are represented and not to deprive them or any of them of the benefits of col-
lective bargaining for the advantage of the representative or those members of the
craft who selected it.7
35. Stone, The Common Law in The United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12-13 (1936);
see also id. at 14-13. Cf. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 US. 243, 249 (1956); United Statcz
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1941); Electrolu:x Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc,, 6 X.Y.2d
556, 569, 161 N.E.2d 197, 204, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977, 937 (1959); Schuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 33-S6, 154 N.E.2d 534, 540, ISO N.YS.2d 265, 273-74 (1953); Landib,
Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213 (1934); Pound, The
Formative Era in American Law 3S-SO (1933); Farnsworth, Implied Warrantic of
Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 653, 654 (1957); Lloyd, The Equity of a
Statute, 53 U. Pa. L. Rev. 76 (1909); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv.
L. Rev. 383, 3SS (1903); Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 4S7, 494 (1959).
By 1944, Chief Justice Stone had put his own recommendation into practice in -,-vcral
significant decisions. In sustaining a state agricultural marheting proram under the com-
merce clause, he drew upon the judgments inherent in farm legislation evcn though that
legislation had no direct application by its terms. Parker v. Brown, 317 US. 341, 367
(1943); see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 US. 761, 773 (1945). In !several land-
mark cases arising under the patent laws, he applied policies derived from the antitrut lavw
in finding that the powers granted by the patent laws implicd cerrc,.ponding re- lnibini-
ties not to use this power aga st the public interest by employing it to sccure a mri:po-ly
beyond that granted by the patent. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefierzon Elcc. Co., 317 U.S. 173
(1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 4S3 (1942).
36. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and evcn if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly poesible by which the qucstion
may be avoided." Brandeis, J., concurring in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 233, 343 (1936),
quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). See also Ex parte Endo, 323 US. 233,
297-300 (1944) (decided on the same day as the Steele case). For subscquent ca :s zee,
e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959); Rent v. Dulles, 357 US. 116, 129
(1958). Compare Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 402 & n2
(1958).
Mr. Justice M1urphy, concurring in Steele, relied exclusively on the constitutional ground
and on an interpretation of the statute that would avoid invalldity, rather than on in-
ferences drawn from the statute independent of constitutional queztions. 323 US. at
203-09.
37. 323 U.S. at 201. Compare James v. larinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P2d 329
(1945); American Civil Liberties Union, Democracy in Trade Unions 3 (1959); Cf. ' Wazh.
& Lee L. Rev. 234 (1951).
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So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory representative of a craft,
it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable front the power of
representation conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft. 8
In determining the precise nature and extent of the obligations to
be imposed, Chief Justice Stone looked to the past treatment of analogous
situations. An analogy to the voluntarily appointed agent supported
the general conclusion that a duty should be imposed. 9 But it proved of
only limited value, since the powers of the bargaining agent were exer-
cised by virtue of the agent's selection by a majority, not by the indi-
vidual employee, and its authority could be revoked only through
statutory procedures.40
The second analogy was stated thusly:
[T]he representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is
subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or dis-
criminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also under
an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights.41
We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative
of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members
of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection
to the interests of those for whom it legislates.42
Under the equal protection principle, 43 relevant differentiations are
permissible, but not those plainly irrelevant. Applying this concept to
the obligations of the bargaining agent, Chief Justice Stone would allow
distinctions based on such factors as seniority or skill, while "discrimi-
nations based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious."4
The Railroad and the Brotherhood argued that Steele should not be
allowed to resort to the courts until he had exhausted the procedures
of the Railroad Adjustment Board, made up of representatives of the
38. 323 U.S. at 204. (Emphasis added.)
39. "It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to
act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the
power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be deemed
to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed." 323
U.S. at 202.
40. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability
of Labor Relations, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 313 (1960); Comment, 66 Yale L.J. 223 (1956).
41. 323 U.S. at 198.
42. Id. at 202.
43. Chief Justice Stone here anticipated the holding of the District of Columbia segre-
gation decision, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), in implicitly applying the constitu-
tional requirement of equal protection to the federal government under the general require-
ment of due process even in the absence of a specific equal protection clause in the fifth
amendment.
44. 323 U.S. at 203.
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carriers and of the railway labor organizations. Chief Justice Stone
pointed out that this would require the Negro firemen to appear before
a group which was in large part chosen by those against whom their
real complaint was made." Therefore, he rejected any such require-
ment,"0 holding that the Adjustment Board's procedures applied to
disputes which were primarily between employees and carriers, not those
primarily between employees and their representatives.
As a result of the holding that the Adjustment Board did not have
exclusive jurisdiction, the normal rule that state courts may enforce
federal rights4 7 applied, and the Supreme Court remanded the case to
the state court for further proceedings. "s Injunctive relief against both
the Railroad and the Brotherhood was held proper:
The representative which thus discriminates may be enjoined from so doing, and
its members may be enjoined from taking the benefit of such discriminatory action.
No more is the Railroad bound by or entitled to take the benefit of a contract 'which
the bargaining representative is prohibited by the statute from making.4 9
45. Id. at 2C6.
46. Chief Justice Stone cited Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), in which Chief
Justice Taft, relying upon a tradition extending back to Dr. Bonham's Case, 3 Co. Rep.
113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610), held invalid a procedure whereby a criminal
defendant could be tried before a mayor although the city for which he had exceutive
responsibility received part of the proceeds of any fines levied on conviction. The Court
held that to require a person's rights to be determined by a tribunal having a direct in-
terest in the outcome violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Forer, Psychiatric Evidence in the Re-
cusation of Judges, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1325 (1960); Note, C0 Colum. L. Rev. 349 (MO0).
This principle is applicable in civil as well as criminal casez. See Hansbzrry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 45 (1940); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 293 U.S. 38, 73 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Brady v. TWA, 167 F. Supp. 469, 472 (D. Dl. 1953); Johncon
v. Milk Marketing Bd., 295 lich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940); Frome United Brc'.'rie3
Co. v. Bath Justices, [19261 A.C. 5S6, 590. It was applied to "private govmmcnt" in
ATC Agency Resolution Investigation, CCH Av. L. Rep. 222,2, at 14533-35 (CAB
June 10, 1959).
47. See The Federalist No. S2, at 422 (Beloff ed. 194S) (Hamilton); Claflin v. House-
man, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876). In fact, state courts not only may enforce federal ribts
where federal jurisdiction is not exclusive, but cannot discriminate again-t federal rights
and, accordingly, are required to enforce them to the same extent as Etate-creatcd rights
of a similar nature. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 3S6 (1947); Ward v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
4S. In a companion case brought in a federal court, federal jurisdiction of the claim
was upheld under a provision conferring federal jurisdiction in cases ariing under laws
regulating commerce. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fircmen, 323 U.S. 210
(1944), citing the predecessor of 2S U.S.C. § 1337 (1953). See Mulford v. Smith, 307
U.S. 3S, 46 (1939); cf. Leedom v. K1yne, 353 U.S. 184 (1953).
49. 323 U.S. at 203-04. The propriety of injunctive relief in such cases under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1953), ha bcn
upheld where statutory duties were to be enforced in Tcxtile Workers v. Lincoln DMill,
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C. The Historic Significance of the Steele Decision
1. The Scope of the Holding
Within the confines of the specific facts of the case, Steele held that
a collective bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act could be
enjoined from applying an agreement which discriminated on the basis
of race against nonmembers who belonged to the craft. However, the
chain of reasoning by which this result was reached turned upon con-
cepts of far wider applicability. Since each of these steps was im-
portant to the decision, they must be regarded as parts of the holding:
(1) By acknowledging that a substantial constitutional question would
arise under any other construction of the statute, Steele indicated, al-
though it did not expressly decide, that governmental action could be
found in the exercise of powers delegated by law to private groups,
thereby requiring that constitutional safeguards be respected in their
exercise.
(2) As a rule of statutory interpretation apart from constitutional
considerations, Steele established that where powers are granted by law,
corresponding responsibilities of fairness may be enforced even though
not explicitly spelled out in the statute granting the power.
(3) In the specific field of the duties of bargaining representatives,
Steele, through its analogy between unions and the public government,
established the constitutional limitations applicable to the latter as a
yardstick by which the obligations of a union to those it represents may
be measured.
That Steele arose under the Railway Labor Act was not controlling;
decisions dealing with exclusive bargaining authority under both the
RLA and the NLRA were cited in the opinion as being to the same ef-
fect,5 and legislative history of the NLRA was cited in a footnote to
show that the NLRA was derived from the RLA.P2 The same quasi-
legislative powers are granted under both the NLRA and the RLA.
Subsequent decisions have confirmed that the principles laid down in
Steele are as applicable under the NLRA as under the RLA.Sa
353 U.S. 448 (1957); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ill. R.R., 353
U.S. 30 (1957). See Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 354 (1958).
50. "Here as elsewhere a position cannot be divorced from its supporting reasons;
the reasons are, indeed, a part and most important part of the position." Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1959).
51. 323 U.S. at 200, citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342 (1944) (RLA); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (NLRA); Medo
Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) (NLRA).
52. 323 U.S. at 202 n.3, citing H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), and
S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
53. The leading case is Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), which arose under
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Although the discrimination in Steele was effectuated by means of a
discriminatory contract, the broad nature of the duty of fairness im-
posed indicated that it would apply to all aspects of the bargaining
process. In 1957 the Supreme Court held that the duties imposed in
Steele extended to the handling of grievances as well as the negotiation
of agreementsY5
Although it was important that the unfair treatment in Steec con-
sisted of discrimination based on race because racial distinction among
employees was obviously "irrelevant and invidious," the opinion indi-
cated that other unfair treatment would also be prohibited if it could
be clearly identified as such, and this conclusion is borne out by later
cases.
5
the NLRA and held Steele applicable in a unanimous per curiam order citing, without
further explanation, Steele and two RLA casss following it. Such per curiam dci rons
have the same technical precedent value as full opinions. See Northwectern Statc3 Portland
Cement Co. v. 'Minnesota, 353 U.S. 450, 460 (1959), and the concurring opinion thbedn,
id. at 467-6S; Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates v. City of New York, 5 NX.2d 347, 356-
57, 157 N.E.2d 614, 619, 104 N.Y.S.2d 623, 630 (1959); Addrczs by Mr. Justice Harlan, 13
Record of N.Y.C.BA. 541, 546 (1953). In Syres, supra, the judgment below, which was
reversed by the Supreme Court, had been based in part on an attempted diztinction
between the RLA and NLRA. See 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 350 US.
392 (1955). The reasoning of the Supreme Court is probably reflected in the dc:nting
opinion of Judge Rives in the court of appeaL, which demonstratcs the inapplicability of
any LLRA-RLA distinction to the Steele principle. 223 F2d at 745. Additional siupport
for the Syres holding is furnished by Ford Motor Co. v. Hufiman, 345 U.S. 330, 337
(1953) (clear dictum referring to RLA and NLRA as comparable); Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 243, 255-56 (1944); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 US. 17, 47-43
(1954) (utilizing the Steele principle under the NLRA as a prcmie for its reasoning). See
Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 190, 199 (1959). Numerous lower court deckions iolloving
Syres have assumed the applicability of Steele under the NLRA but denicd rdicf on other
grounds, such as that the union conduct under review was not unrcaionable, as was the
case in Ford Mlotor Co. v. Huffman. See, e.g., Ostrofsky v. United Stcedworker, 171 F.
Supp. 732, 793 (D. Md. 1959). Relief was granted by the state court in Crowll v. Palmer,
134 Conn. 502, 53 A.2d 729 (194S).
54. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). See also Dillard v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry,
199 F.2d 943, 951 (4th Cir. 1952); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F2d 69, 74 (5th Cir.
1945); Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 116 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1953);
Griffin v. Gulf & S.LR.R., 193 Miss. 45S, 21 So. 2d S14 (1945); Note, 36 N.C.L. Rev. 529
(1953).
55. The chief Supreme Court authority for the proposition that Steele is not co2nfined
to racial discrimination is a dictum in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 333
(1953). Recent lower court decisions clearly support this position. E.g, Cunningbam v.
Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1959); Mount v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of LMcomoti-e
Eng'rs, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 967 (1956); Cherico v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 167 F. Supp. 635, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Crowell v.
Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 53 A.2d 729 (1943). To the same effect are the implications of
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 47-43 (1954), and Wallace Corp. v. XLRB,
323 U.S. 243, 255-56 (1944). The views of commentators are in accord. See Cox, The
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Chief Justice Stone noted: "Since petitioner and the other Negro
members of the craft are not members of the Brotherhood or eligible for
membership, the authority to act for them is derived not from their
action or consent but wholly from the command of the Act."' 0 Did this
mean that the obligations of the bargaining representative imposed by
Steele were applicable only to those who were actively denied member-
ship in the union? Chief Justice Stone called it a "duty to exercise
fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it
acts, without hostile discrimination against them. ' s7 This language in-
dicated that the duty of fairness runs to members and nonmembers
alike. It is now clear that this interpretation is correct. s This is reason-
able because it is the irrevocable and compulsory agency analogous to
governmental power which is created by the statute, not any voluntary
agency created by union membership, 9 upon which is based the duty
imposed in Steele.
Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Viii. L. Rev. 151, 159-60 (1957). The same result Is also
reached if decisions under the equal protection clause are brought to bear by analogy.
See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The
former view that the equal protection clause applied only to racial discrimination, ex-
pressed in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873), is no longer fol-
lowed.
56. 323 U.S. at 199.
57. Id. at 203. (Emphasis added.)
58. The leading decision is Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), discussed in note
53 supra, in which the plaintiffs were union members and were denied relief by the court
of appeals on that ground and also because the case arose under the NLRA rather than
the RLA. See 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955). The Supreme Court unanimously reversed
in a per curiam order, citing Steele and two cases following it, without further explanation,
but the reasoning it probably used is indicated by Judge Rives' dissent in the court of
appeals, 223 F.2d at 745. See Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 116 F.
Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1953). See also Thompson v. Moore Drydock Co., 27 Cal. 2d 595, 165
P.2d 901 (1946); cf. Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 599
(1958); Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 190 (1959). Commentators agree that Steele Is
applicable to union members as well as nonmembers. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation,
2 Vill. L. Rev. 151, 154-55 (1957); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation:
Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1335 (1958); Comment,
49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 357, 360 (1954).
59. Although the union constitution is often considered a contract (see International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618-19 (1958); Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y.
277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931)), it is a "contract of adhesion" and therefore should not be
construed to easily waive important rights to fair treatment. See Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 204-06 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting) ; Ehrenzwelg,
Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072 (1953); Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev.
629 (1943); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700 (1939); cf. Rentways, Inc. v.
O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 348, 126 N.E.2d 271, 273 (1955), and cases
cited. Compare Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958);
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Thus the facts that Steele arose under the RLA rather than NLRA,
that discrimination was based on race and effectuated by means of a
contract, and that Steele was not a member of the Brotherhood were
merely incidental rather than essential to the result. The controlling
facts in Steele were merely that a collective bargaining agent had acted
unfairly toward some of those it was bound to represent, and that the
unfairness was sufficiently clear that the courts could intervene without
unduly disrupting the bargaining function. On a wider plane, the sig-
nificant facts were that those holding private power over others by virtue
of a federal statute had used that power unfairly, leading the Court to
interpret the statute to ban such conduct.
As early as 1915, Harlan F. Stone had written that develop-
ments in the law arose less from the personal views of judges than
from the "steady pressure of facts and events"CO proved in court. His
approach of adaptation of recognized concepts to new facts on the basis
of past efforts in analogous situations was of the utmost significance to
his conception of the judicial function. 1 But the sensitiveness to "the
steady pressure of facts and events" exemplified in Stecle is of further
significance in dealing with the problems raised by concentrated power.
To the extent that courts interpret broad language such as that found
in Steele to confer rights to fair treatment in the exercise of power
upon those affected by it, the arbitrary exercise of that power is limited
without the necessity of comprehensive administrative regulationc '-2
Regulation is achieved in the first instance by the participation of those
most directly concerned, while the courts remain in reserve to illustrate
in concrete cases the standards of what is permissible and to guarantee
fairness where voluntary observance of the standards is lacling. Thus, a
less complex system of administrative supervision becomes possible, and
the much-discussed dangers that the administrative body itself may
Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 190 (1959). An additional problem concern., whether the
member knew what rights might be jeopardized by the proviins in queaion. Compare
Sandler v. Commonwealth Station Co., 307 lass. 470, 30 N.E.2d 3S9 (1940); Jones V.
Great No. Ry., 63 Mont. 231, 217 P. 673 (1923); cif. Lambert v. California, 355 US. 225,
228-29 (1957) (actual or probable kmowledge required for valid punishment for violation
of criminal law imposing affirmative duty).
60. Stone, Law and Its Administration 39 (1915). See aico id. at 47-4,.
61. Konefsky, Chief Jusice Stone and the Supreme Court 260-64 (1945); Mlason,
Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 233-51 (1955); Dowling, The Mcthds, of Mr.
Justice Stone in Constitutional Cases, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 1160, 1166-67 (1941). Cf. Com-
mons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 346-52 (1924).
62. This is the philosophy underlying the NLRA, vhich pcrmits employez3 themhlves
to select collective bargaining representatives to bargain out terms and conditior- of en-
ployment with employers, with the Government serving as a referee rather than as a
central participant. Compare Mitchell v. Robert DeMarlo Jewelry, Inc., 361 US. 28, 292
(1960) (Harlan, J.).
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not always act in the public interest, or that it may unduly favor one
of the regulated groups over another, 3 are reduced.
This approach does not seem properly open to criticism as a judicial
assumption of legislative functions so long as the express words of the
statute and its fundamental purposes form the starting point for reason-
ing and so long as new developments are based upon precedent.
2. Steele as a Precedent in Adapting Our Traditions to the
Problems of "Private Government"
A landmark decision like Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., like a parable
illustrating a moral principle, can have important consequences in help-
ing to form private judgments of what is right 4 as well as serving as a
starting point for judicial reasoning in future cases. This educational
function of Steele was greatly strengthened by its roots in the nation's
traditional struggle with the problems of concentrated power. In the
earliest days of the Republic, Thomas Jefferson, in the Declaration of
Independence, had condemned government without representation, and
the Constitution and Bill of Rights sought to protect the citizen from the
arbitrary exercise of governmental power. In its union-legislature
analogy, Steele evoked the experience built up in the national efforts to
maintain a public government strong enough to protect and provide for
the people while at the same time assuring representation of the gov-
erned and protection of the individual from arbitrary action, 5 and
brought this experience to bear upon the emerging problems of the
"private governments"00 created by modern industrialism. 7  In being
63. See Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1131-32 (1953);
Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1105, 1107-13 (1954); Lewis, To Regulate the Regulators, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1959,
§ 6 (Magazine), p. 13; Note, Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws, 58 Colum. L.
Rev. 673, 678 (1958).
64. See Jones, Book Review, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 755, 758 (1958).
65. Compare Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 143
(1958).
66. See Miller, Private Governments and the Constitution (1959); Friedmann, Cor-
porate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 155
(1957). See also Hanslowe, The Need for a Political Science of Collective Bargaining, In
Symposium on Labor Relations Law (Slovenko ed., to be published 1961).
67. "It will be found that as modern conditions arose the trend of legislation and
judicial decision came more and more to adapt the recognized restrictions to new mani-
festations of conduct or of dealing which it was thought justified the inference of intent
to do the wrongs which it had been the purpose to prevent from the beginning. The
evolution . . . will be found to be illustrated in various aspects by the decisions of this
court which have been concerned with the enforcement of the act we are now consider-
ing." White, C. J., in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1911) (an-
nouncing a rule of reason under the Sherman Act).
"[A] bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on
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guided by this tradition, Chief Justice Stone not only found criteria to
aid him in evaluating the facts before himc, but also drew upon the
reservoirs of the nation's common experience to aid public understand-
ing 9 of his decision so that its example could be applied intelligently
in the future.
Most of the subsequent cases dealing with the Steele principle did not
explicitly refer to the analogy between public and private government
employed by Chief Justice Stone, but the decisions may be explained in
terms of that concept, and it appears to be the necessary underlying
basis of several of the important results.
A bargaining agreement similar to that in Steele, designed to deprive
Negro employees of their jobs, arose in Brotherlzood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Howard.7" The Steele ruling was not directly applicable since the
affected employees were not members of the craft for which the Brother-
hood bargained, and therefore were not actually represented by it. But
a legislature has a duty to protect the rights of all those for whom it
legislates, both citizens and noncitizens within its jurisdiction. By
analogy, then, the union would have a duty towards all those for whom
it "legislates," i.e., over whom it has effective power, whether or not
they are actually represented by the union.71 The Court's decision,
earth . . . ." Letter From Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1737, in 6 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 385, 383 (Monticlo ed. 1'04).
It may well be that Steele essentially applied the method described by Chief Juztice
White to the purpose stated by Thomas Jefferson in utilizing the analog, bctween public
and private government to interpret the term "representative" in the ctatute conferring
exclusive bargaining rights.
6S. Cf. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 346-47 (1924).
69. Compare Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 352 (1924); Drucker, The
Future of Industrial Man 263-65 (1942).
70. 343 U.S. 76S (1952).
71. On the basis of this interpretation of Howard, Courant v. International Photo-
graphers, 176 F.2d 10C (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 943 (19E0), would appar
to have been wrongly decided. Courant, a Canadian citizen, was denied admLi_-on to the
union because he was an alien, and as a practical result he was unable to obtain work.
The court refused relief because the union did not represent Courant, a contention made
in the Howard case with respect to nonmembers of the craft but rejected by the Supreme
Court. If Howard bans wholly arbitrary discrimination against the mimbers of other
crafts, the same principle should logically extend to those sceking employment. If what
are permissible distinctions for public action furnish a guide, discrimination agai*nt aliew
would be invalid where citizenship is not relevant to the needs of the union or the work
to be performed. Yick Wo v. Hoplins, 113 U.S. 356 (186). Se Truax v. Raich, 239
US. 33 (1915); Rezler, Admission Policy of American Trade Unions Concerning Immi-
grant Workers, 11 Labor L.J. 367 (1960). Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions of Aliens'
Right to Vote, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1012 (1957). For Chief Justice Stone's view, !ee his
concurring opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 495, 525 (1939); Lief, Introduction to Stone,
Public Control of Business at xi (Lief ed. 1940); Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the
Law 113, 578-32 (1955).
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granting relief to the complaining employees, was framed in terms
which do not seem far from this principle: "Bargaining agents who en-
joy the advantages of the Railway Labor Act's provisions must execute
their trust without lawless invasions of the rights of other workers." 2
The public-private government analogy evokes also the principle that,
as power implies responsibility, the latter further implies reasonable
authority to meet it. This principle (without specific reference to the
analogy) was applied in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,78 involving a
collective bargaining agreement giving seniority credit for time served
in the armed forces to employees with no prior service in the company,
thus placing them ahead of former employees who had longer service
with the company but less military service. The contract was challenged
by certain employees as a violation of their rights under the Selective
Service Act requirements that returning veterans be restored to their
jobs without loss of seniority.74 In upholding the contract, a unanimous
Court said: "The National Labor Relations Act ... gives a bargaining
representative not only wide responsibility but authority to meet that
responsibility."7 5
In an earlier case, Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell,70 the Court had
upheld an agreement providing "super-seniority" for union chairmen
so that, because of their importance to the effectiveness of collective
bargaining, they might remain at work even while others with longer
service were laid off. The national policy encouraging collective bargain-
ing,77 therefore, overrode an otherwise applicable statutory provision
which might injure the bargaining function, just as restrictions on public
government in the interests of the rights of the individual are not per-
mitted to cripple its functions. The same result would flow from appli-
cation of the public-private government analogy, since the legislature is
empowered to make reasonable classification in economic measures, and
only where they are plainly arbitrary will they be invalidated. The task
of preventing obvious unfairness while preserving the vigor of the bar-
gaining function is a difficult one'7 but essentially the same difficulty is
72. 343 U.S. at 774.
73. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
74. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 § 8(b), ch. 720, 54 Stat, 890, as
amended, ch. 548, 58 Stat. 798 (1944). (now Universal Military Training and Service Act
§ 9(b), 62 Stat. 614 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b) (1958)).
75. 345 U.S. at 339.
76. 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
77. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act §§ 1, 7, 9, 49 Stat. 449, 452, 453 (1935), as
amended, 61 Stat. 136, 140, 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 159 (1958);
cf. Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
78. See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Viii. L. Rev. 151, 167 (1957); Welling-
ton, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System,
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encountered in applying the limitations imposed by the due process and
equal protection clauses to public government, or whenever two compet-
ing policies are each of such importance that neither can be rejected in
favor of the other but the demands of both must be recognized in a
workable synthesis. 3
It has been suggested s° that, as a matter of constitutional interpreta-
tion, the limitations imposed by due process should be held applicable to
private groups, such as unions and business corporations, which exercise
substantial economic power. The view that these limitations apply only
to governmental action would not prevent the gradual extension of the
concept of governmental action itself to include action which has a coer-
cive effect similar to that exerted by governmental sanctions, where this
is made possible in part by action or underlying permission of public
authorities who are themselves bound by the constitutional limitations.
However, the analogy between public and private government was not
actually applied as a constitutional requirement in Stecle but as a guide
in statutory interpetation. Reliance on statutory rather than constitu-
tional interpretation had the advantage of greater flexibility and also
avoided the necessity of defining in advance the precise limits of govern-
mental action for constitutional purposes. Under this approach, legal
protection of individual rights within "private governments" may develop
both through the enactment of new statutes and by their interpretation
in the light of the fundamental considerations explored in Stecle, one of
which was to construe the statute so as to avoid constitutional objections.
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19591 repre-
sents a basic national decision calling for greater protection of some of
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution in the realm of private as well
as public government, even though many difficult questions of interpre-
tation must be resolved if the statute is to promote rather than restrict
these rights. We turn now to the statute and its interrelation with the
principles laid down in Steele.
67 Yale L.J. 1327, 133943, 1357-61 (195S); cf. King, Protecting Rights of Minority Em-
ployees, 11 Lab. L.J. 143 (1960).
79. Compare the synthesis between regulatory statutes and the antitrust law: dicuszed
in Note, Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws: Substantive and Procedural Co-
ordination, 53S Colum. L. Rev. 673 (195S); between labor and antitrust statute:, United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); between patent and antitrust policic, Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 3S6 (1945).
SO. Berle, Economic Power and the Free Sodety 17-13 (1957); Berle, Constitutional
Limitations on Corporate Acivity-Protection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through
Economic Power, 10 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 943, 94S-57 (1952); BcrIe, Legal ProblCm5 of
Economic Power, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 4, 9-10 (1960).
S1. 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. I, 1959).
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II. THE 1959 LEGISLATION
The 1959 labor reform statute consists of three major groups of
provisions. The first group deals with individual rights, 2 and the
second with reporting requirements and prohibitions on such prac-
tices as payments by employers to union officials."3 The third group
amends the Taft-Hartley Act, forbids certain types of boycotts and pick-
eting which had been found coercive in some cases,8 4 and seeks to elim-
inate a "no man's land" between state and federal jurisdiction over labor
disputes.85 Our attention will focus chiefly on questions relating to the
first group of provisions.
A. Standards for the Rights of Union Members
Section 101(a)(2) provides:
Freedom of speech and assembly.-Every member of any labor organization
shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to
express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor
organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or
upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's estab-
lished and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That
nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt
and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the
organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere
with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.8 "
This section has been chosen for separate examination because its pat-
tern of a broad statement of rights followed by a proviso permitting rea-
sonable qualifications is followed throughout the individual rights sections
of the act.8 7 The rights are closely analogous to those guaranteed by the
82. Title I-Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations, §§ 101-05, 73 Stat. 522,
29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (Supp. I, 1959). Title III-Trusteeships, 39 301-06, 73 Stat. 330, 29
U.S.C. §§ 461-66 (Supp. I, 1959). Title IV-Elections, §§ 401-04, 73 Stat. 532, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 481-83 (Supp. I, 1959).
83. Title II-Reporting by Labor Organizations, Officers and Employees of Labor
Organizations, and Employers, §§ 201-10, 73 Stat. 524, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-40 (Supp. I,
1959).
84. Title VI-Miscellaneous Provisions, §§ 601-11, 73 Stat. 539, 29 U.S.C. §§ 521-31
(Supp. I, 1959).
Title VII-Amendments to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, As Amended,
33 701-07, 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158, 159-60, 186-87 (Supp. 1, 1959). See comment,
28 Fordham L. Rev. 737 (1960).
85. Section 701(a), 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. 1, 1959).
86. 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (Supp. 1, 1959).
87. E.g., § 101(a)(1) provides: "Equal Rights. Every member of a labor organization
shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to
vote in elections or referendums of the labor organizations, to attend membership meetings,
and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, sub-
ject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws."
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first amendment.s If constitutional precedents are used as a guidepost,
limitations on the rights granted, in order to be sustained as reasonable,
would have to be justified by important needs of the union"9 which other-
wise could not be met effectively."" An interest in preventing criticism
of officials, even unfounded criticism, would not suffice,"' nor would an
interest in checking ideas and opinions viewed as undesirable. 2 Restric-
tions which might be upheld include a ban on means of speech that
would interfere with the rights of others, 03 such as a filibuster or up-
roar at meetings preventing the transaction of business.' The same
principle would apply to "fighting words" tending to cause im-
mediate violence. 5 Libel or slander poses a difficult problem, because
while defamation is not considered constitutionally protected," a ban
on defamation might be used to cloak penalties for criticism of officials.
By becoming a public figure in a union, as in politics, one should be held
to have opened himself to fair, if critical, comment. It may also be
that the defense of truth must be permitted where the statements do not
threaten to cause violence or a breach of the peace.' 7 Advocacy or action
73 Stat. 522, 29 US.C. § 411(a) (1) (Supp. I, 1959).
Section 401(e): "[E]very member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate
and to hold office (subject to . .. reasonable qualifications uniformly impo:cd)... ." 73
Stat. 533, 29 U.S.C. § 4S1(e) (Supp. I, 1959).
S. "[N]o American living today, whether he is a member of a union or not, L vithout
the rights contained in this so-called bill of rights, because they are substantially contained
in the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution. The only argument is that we may be
applying them in a field that is completely new." 105 Cong. Rec. 14377 (daily cd. Aug.
12, 1959) (remarks of Representative Landrum).
S9. Compare Butier v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 3S0, 33 (1957); Joneph Burztyn, Inc. v.
Vilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952).
90. See Taley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring) ; Mincrvlea
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 5S6, 603-04 (1940) (Stone, J., dizsenting). Compare the
approach in commerce clause cases such as Dean Milk Co. v. Mladion, 340 U.S. 349
(1951); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 7S1-$2 (1945); South Carolina High-
way Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 16-37 n.4 (193S).
91. Compare Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Near v. Blinnezota, 2G3 U.S. 697
(1930), with Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1953); Comment, 59 Colum.
L. Rev. 190 (1959); see Summers, Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 Yale
LJ. 175, 192-96 (1960).
92. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 64 (1959). But see Mitchell v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 45 L.R.R.1. 2926 (Cal. Super. CL 19L0), upholding
expulsion for right-to-work advocacy. The federal act would appear to dictate a contrary
conclusion.
93. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 US. 77 (1949) (blaring sound truchs); Con v. New
Hampshire, 312 US. 569 (1941) (street parades).
94. Cf. Robert's Rules of Order, Revised §§ 40, 53 (75th annivcrzary cd. 1951).
95. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
96. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
97. See id. at 254.
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directly contrary to the unmistakable and urgent needs of the union as
such9" (as distinct from contrary to the policies of particular officials or
their continuance in office99), such as urging a back-to-work movement or
supporting a rival union after joining the disciplining union or after its
selection by a majority,'00 might be contrary to "the responsibilities of
every member toward the organization as an institution"''1 and therefore
subject to union discipline.102 The ban on ex post facto laws in public
government'0 3 and two Supreme Court cases prior to the 1959 act, in
which expulsion led to loss of employment in a closed shop, 104 suggest
that support of a rival union by an employee prior to joining the disci-
plining union, or prior to its selection as bargaining agent, could not be
penalized. It appears that the internal political activities of full time
union member employees may be regulated to prevent their use for either
side in election contests'0 5 and that Communists, Fascists and other to-
talitarians may,0 8 and Communist Party members and those convicted
of certain crimes must. 7 be barred from union office. Payment of dues
obviously is a reasonable prerequisite to participation in union decisions,
although even this requirement may not be implemented by discrimina-
torily harsh sanctions not uniformly applied. 0 8
98. Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (urging noncompliance with
military draft).
99. See Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958);
Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 190 (1959).
100. See Seidman & Melcher, The Dual Union Clause and Political Rights, 11 Labor
L.J. 797 (1960).
101. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 101(a)(2), 73 Stat.
522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (Supp. I, 1959).
102. See Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609,
617 (1959); Wollett & Lampman, The Law of Union Factionalism-The Case of the
Sailors, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 177, 211 (1952); Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 190, 200 (1959).
103. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
104. Compare the facts in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 256 (1944), with those
in Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 359 (1949). The Palmolive-Pcet
opinion, if not the actual result under the particular facts, seems open to criticism as
avoiding discussion of the real issues before the Court. Cf. 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and
Collective Bargaining § 77(5), at 217-21 (1940).
105. Cf. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
106. Cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). This question
would arise directly under § 401(e) rather than § 101(a) (2), but only conduct for which
a penalty would be permitted under § 101(a) (2) would probably form a "reasonable"
basis for disqualification under § 401(e), quoted at note 87 supra.
107. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 504, 73 Stat. $36, 29
U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. I, 1959).
108. NLRB v. Biscuit & Cracker Workers, 222 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1955); Brady v. TWA,
174 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Del. 1959); see Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 § 101(a)(3), 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (Supp. 1, 1959); cf. Felter v.
Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959); National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (5), added
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B. The Rights of Employees Rejected for Membership
A serious problem inherent in the structure of the act is that all of the
rights explicitly conferred on individual employees are stated in terms of
the rights of union members. Statements seeming to confirm that this
was intentional appear frequently in the legislative history.'t 3 However,
the grant of individual rights by the act would be easily evaded if these
rights could be denied by the expedient of refusing union membership.1"
The result would be that, although section 101 (a) ( 1) purports to confer
"Equal Rights," some employees would be "more equal than others." ''
They would be second class citizens in their industrial government, de-
nied not merely the rights conferred by the union itself, but also those
conferred by the federal statute. However, the language of the statute
does not compel such a result, nor does it appear permissible under the
Constitution or under the obligations imposed in the Steele decision,
which appear unaffected by the statute, as will be demonstrated.
1. Rights Under the 1959 Act
Section 3(o) of the act provides:
"Member" or "member in good standing," w;hen used in reference to a labor or-
ganization, includes any person who has fulfilled the requirements for memberihip in
such organization, and who neither has voluntarily withdrawn from memborahip nor
has been expelled or suspended from membership after appropriate proceeding3 con-
sistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and bylaws of such organization."1-
The term "requirements" clearly implies some degree of generality
perhaps similar to that implied by the conception of law." itself. This does
not demand that results will be completely uniform even when the gov-
erning formulations remain the same, since "the life of doctrinal formula-
tions is in their applications." ' 13 But while general rules grow and
broaden under the pressure of facts and events, their development must
by 61 Stat. 142 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)(S) (19-5). See aL79 NLRB v.
Spector Freight Sys., 273 F.2d 272 (th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (190).
109. See, e.g., 105 Cong. Rec. 143S9 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1959) (remarlz of Rcpreenta-
tive Landrum).
110. The denial could be effective aainst any who wcre not mcmbers at the time the
decision to exclude was reached. Labor-Management Reporting and Diclosure Act of 195",
§§ 101(a)(5), 609, 73 Stat. 523, 541, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(5), 529 (Supp. I, 1959), would
protect enisting members from improper expulsion.
111. Orwell, Animal Farm (1946). See Aaron, The Labor-Managment Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv. L. Re,. 851, S60 (1960).
112. 73 Stat. 521, 29 U.S.C. § 402(o) (Supp. I, 1959).
113. Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxe.s, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 710 (1947).
See his interesting specific examples in New Light on Gross Receipts Taxe, 53 Hfaz,. L.
Rev. 909, 924 (1940); cf. Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinihns in the Supreme Court,.
57 Mich. L. Rev. 151, 174-75 (195S).
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rest on principles transcending the result in any particular case.'14 In
other words, decisions must be based on more than the mere fiat of those
making them. Without at least this degree of generality, the term would
have little meaning. If a completely arbitrary decision would satisfy sec-
tion 3(o), it would more appropriately"6 have stated that "member"
means one who has been admitted to membership by the organization
rather than one who has fulfilled the requirements for membership.
Even a generally stated limitation should not automatically rise to the
dignity of a "requirement" under section 3 (o)." 6 Otherwise a limitation
as obviously arbitrary as a ban on specifically named persons'1 would
have to be recognized. The enactment of a broad term such as "require-
ments" "necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which required
that some standard should be resorted to.... ."I8 If decisions under consti-
tutional guarantees applicable to public government are drawn upon,
those interpreting due process of law seem most appropriate as imposing
the minimum standards of fairness. Thus, for recognition under section
3(o), a limitation should be required to have both general applicability
beyond a particular case and some minimum relevance to legitimate
union purposes. Racial discrimination would be an obviously invalid
ground. Restrictions based on disagreement with the policies of particu-
lar union officials would fail before the free speech guarantee held in-
herent in due process." 9
The same result would flow from application of the basic principle,
applied in Steele, that power implies responsibility. Where a union is
given power not merely to determine its membership for its own private
purposes but to determine who is to receive rights under a federal statute,
it may be required to exercise this power with minimum fairness toward
those affected.
This possible interpretation of the term "requirements" must be tested
114. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law 97, 101 (1953); Jones, Edwin
Wilhite Patterson: Man and Ideas, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 607, 615-16 (1957); cf. Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1959).
115. Compare Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150 (1960).
116. "The same words, in different settings, may not mean the same thing." Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 678 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.) ; see R. H. Johnson
& Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952).
117. Compare United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (decided under ex post facto
clause). Compare also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 136
(1951), which interpreted the term "determination" to bar purely arbitrary action similar
to that which might be held barred here by the term "requirements."
118. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (announcing rule of
reason under antitrust law).
119. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 887 (1959); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684 (1959); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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against the underlying purposes of the act.120 The declaration of find-
ings, purposes, and policy in section 2 speaks in terms of the rights of
employees,""' not of union members as such. Granting the specified
rights to union members leaves the union the power to make reasonable
exclusions necessary for its own self-protection, but a denial of the rights
conferred by the act through an arbitrary exclusion would destroy the
purpose of the act and so should not be countenanced.
An amendment specifically outlawing racial discrimination was re-
jected by the House. 2 But inferences from the rejection of proposed
provisions are generally inconclusive. 1-21 This is particularly so here,
where many might find a specific anti-discrimination provision unneces-
sary in view of the well-settled judicial constructions holding racial dis-
tinctions affecting substantive rights effectively barred by language as
general as the use of the term "representative" in Steele. Indeed, the
judicial precedents against racial discrimination are so strong that if
Congress had desired to permit racial distinctions in the enforcement of
federal rights, explicit language would probably have been recognized as
necessary to achieve this result.2 4 Further, a specific provision barring
racial discrimination alone might have weakened the general applicabil-
ity of the term "requirements," raising a possible inference that, since
only racial distinctions (or others listed) were specifically banned, other
equally arbitrary types of discrimination might be permitted.25
The legislative history also shows that, in the bill passed by the Sen-
120. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 4$0, 44 (1937); Church of The Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1S92). Cf. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jwvelry,
Inc., 361 U.S. 2SS (1960).
121. Section 2(a) provide: "The Congress finds that, in the public interect, it con-
tinues to be the responsibility of the Federal Government to protect employees' rights to
organize, choose their own representatives, bargain collectively, and otherwise cnge in
concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. .... 
Section 2(b) provides: "The Congress further finds . . . that there have becn a number
of instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees
. . . which require further and supplementary legislation that will afford neccary protcc-
tion of the rights and interests of employees ... " 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S&C. §5 401(a), (b)
(Supp. I, 1959).
122. 105 Cong. Rec. 143SS-S9 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1959).
123. "We walk on quicksand when we try to find in the abscnce of corrective legisi-
tion a controlling legal principle." Helvering v. Hallock, 39 U.S. 10, 121 (1940), quoted
in Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 US. 632, 651 n.U (1949). See Bretel, The
Courts and Lawmaking, in Legal Institutions: Today and Tomorrow 1, 11-15, 25-26
(Paulsen ed. 1959); Hart, Comment, in Legal Institutions: Today and Tomorrow 40,
45-48 (Paulsen ed. 1959). Compare United States v. UMW, 330 US. 252, 252-g3 (1947).
124. Compare Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 233, 303 (1944); cf, Grene v. McElroy, 3L0
U.S. 474, 5306-07 (1959).
125. Compare the result reached in Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. S29
(1916).
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ate, "member" was defined to include any person who had met "the law-
ful requirements for membership."' 120 The Conference Committee version
finally enacted omitted the word "lawful." It might be argued that this
change indicated an intent to recognize any limitation whatever, whether
lawful or otherwise, that the union imposed. Another interpretation,
however, is more consistent with the stated purposes of the act. The
Senate version might have been read to mean that there were unlawful as
well as lawful requirements for membership. If it had been so enacted,
adherence to "unlawful" qualifications, even for internal union purposes
not.regulated by the act, might be held enjoinable as contrary to legisla-
tive policy despite the absence in the bill of specific remedies for this
purpose.". But this would require the union to admit persons to mem-
bership against its will, contrary to the intention of Section 8(b) (1) (A)
of the Taft-Hartley Act. 2 ' Omission of the word "lawful," on the other
hand, avoids this dilemma.
As enacted, therefore, the statute recognizes a distinction between
"membership" for private, internal union purposes and "membership"
for purposes of determining the beneficiaries of the rights conferred by
the statute. The distinction will be relevant when the union discriminates
upon a purely arbitrary basis. For its own purposes, no limitation upon
membership will be unlawful. But an employee arbitrarily excluded
should still be entitled to the rights specified in the statute, including the
right to vote in union elections'" and to express his views at union meet-
ings consistent with reasonable restrictions.
An intent to permit exclusion of Communists is indicated in the Senate
debates; 3 this would find support in the judicial holding prior to the
act that Communists may be barred from union office because of the
history of instigation of political strikes.'8 ' However, application of con-
stitutional precedents might well require for recognition of an exclusion
126. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601(n) (1959) (as passed).
127. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 290-91 (1960) ; Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S.
515, 552 (1937); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,
569 (1930).
128. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (A) (1958). See also Steele v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R., supra note 127, at 204 (dictum); Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied because of "the
abstract context in which the questions . . ." were presented, 359 U.S. 935 (1959); Ross
v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.V.2d 315 (1957). Contra, Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169
P.2d 831 (1946). For a succinct discussion of the constitutional problems involved, see
29 Miss. L.J. 335 (1958).
129. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 §§ 101(a)(1), 401(c),
73 Stat. 522, 533, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1), 481(e) (Supp. I, 1959).
130. 105 Cong. Rec. 6721 (1959).
131. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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under section 3(o) that Communist, Fascist, or other totalitarian activ-
ities be recent or present'32 and with full knowledge 3  of their nature,
as distinct from activities in the past which have been since clearly aban-
doned.
The determinative question in the interpretation of section 3(o) is
probably whether the statutory statement of objectives, including protec-
tion of the rights of employees, or the contrary implications of some of
the statements in the legislative history, are to control. The courts have
looked to legislative history to an increasing extent in recent decades to
give meaning and purpose to ambiguous statutory words, because the
legislative history can convey a thrust toward a definite objective where
the bare words of the statute fail to do so. Here, on the other hand, we
are not dealing with an alleged "plain meaning" of operative words in the
statute, but a clear-cut statement of congressional purpose enacted into
law in the statute itself. In this context, the reasons for the primacy of
legislative history should no longer apply. As Mr. Justice Jackson once
pointed out, the President does not sign into law the entire Congressional
Record."3 When Congress speaks in the authoritative form of statutory
provisions whose objectives are unmistakably stated, those objectives
should control over any statements by individual legislators in debate."'
Even aside from the interpretation by section 3(o), however, the con-
stitutional requirements of due process of law and the duty of fair repre-
sentation imposed in Steele must be considered.
2. Rights Guaranteed by Due Process of Law
The statute confers rights on "members" of labor organizations. By
controlling who may become a "member," the union may determine who
is entitled to the rights. Since the rights involved are conferred by a
federal statute, this determination is clearly a governmental function
delegated to a private group, and therefore subject to constitutional limi-
tations.' If construed to deny the rights conferred by it to employees
132. Compare the views of eight members of the Court (one Jultice not partldpatin7')
in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 243-46 (1957), and concurring opinion
at 249-51.
133. See Smith v. California, 361 US. 147 (1959); Wkman v. UpdLegraf, 344 US. 103
(1952); cf. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
134. Jackson, J., concurring in Schweggmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 US.
3S4, 396 (1951).
135. As stated by 'Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Some Reflections on the Rcading
of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 543 (1947), reprintcd in Frankfurter, Of Law and
Men 67 (1956): "Spurious use of legislative history must not swallow the legication co as
to give point to the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the
statute."
136. See cases cited in note 33 supra; see also Railway Employes' Dcp't v. Hanon, 351
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arbitrarily rejected for union membership, the statute would encounter
the due process and equal protection objections raised but avoided in
Steele.
It may be argued that it is the fact of union membership and not the
grounds upon which it was denied which is relevant under the statute.
However, to give controlling legal effect to arbitrary private discrimina-
tion is to cause the statute as well as the private group to discriminate
on the invalid ground. If Congress cannot discriminate directly on the
basis, for example, of race, it is hard to see why it could make federal
rights directly dependent upon private discrimination of the same type.Y"1
A second ground for rejecting this argument is the basis of the statute
in Congress' power under the commerce clause. The treatment of union
members affects commerce only because they are employees in industries
engaged in commerce. 3 " The statute is explicitly based, not upon any
effect upon commerce of the treatment of union members as such, but
upon a need for legislation to "afford necessary protection of the rights
and interests of employees . . ."119 and upon a congressional finding
that "the relations between employers and labor organizations and the
millions of workers they represent have a substantial impact on the
commerce of the Nation .... "14o Thus, union membership is merely an
incidental fact which may be used in implementing the rights of em-
ployees, and it would seem that the implementation itself cannot be based
upon purely arbitrary discrimination.
It has been stated,14 1 enacted,' 4 2 and held 14 1 that a union may prescribe
its own qualifications for membership. These holdings will not be dis-
turbed in any way if it is also held that, where such discriminations are
U.S. 225, 232 (1956) ; Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 791 (1959) (the degree of regula-
tion associated with private conduct is significant in classifying it as public action).
137. 'Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1957), 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 571 (1958).
138. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Polish
Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34-41 (1937); Johnson v.
Local 58, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 181 F. Supp. 734 (ED. Mich. 1960) (upholding
§ 101(a) (2) under the commerce clause).
139. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 2(b), 73 Stat. 519,
29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
140. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 2(a), 73 Stat. 519,
29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
141. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (dictum); cf. International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958) (dictum).
142. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (1) (A), added by 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958).
143. See cases cited in note 128 supra.
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arbitrary, they cannot constitutionally be recognized for the purpose of
determining rights under a federal statute.
3. Rights Implicit in the Concept of Fair Representation
Section 603 (b) '4 of the 1959 statute specifies that nothing in the act
(except provisions explicitly amending the Taft-Hartley Act) shall im-
pair rights under the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway La-
bor Act. Since the obligation of fair representation imposed in Steele is
derived from the exclusive bargaining authority conferred by these
statutes, the correlative employee rights are not impaired by the 1959
act. Our inquiry therefore is to determine what rights are implicit in
the concept of fair representation.
Since the duty imposed in Steele was based in considerable part on the
analogy between the powers of an exclusive bargaining agent and those
of a legislature, this analogy must be examined to determine whether it
is relevant here.
The task of reviewing collective bargaining decisions in order to pre-
vent unfairness, while at the same time avoiding hobbling the bargaining
function, is a difficult one.14a In Huffman"o and Campbell,4 7 the Su-
preme Court recognized that bargaining agents must be given broad
discretion in order to perform their function. But difficulties involved in
seeking an accommodation between the need for broad powers to act and
the need to protect individual rights are not new ones. Precisely the
same problem has been encountered in judicial review of the acts of
public government. From 1905 to 1937 the Supreme Court responded
in many instances by striking down as unconstitutional""' legislation
which conflicted with conceptions of individual rights and limited gov-
ernmental powers accepted by many at that time but which are not now
believed to have been embodied in the Constitution. Many of these
144. 73 Stat. 540, 29 U.S.C. § 523(b) (Supp. I, 1959), which provides. "Netbin4z c ,n-
tained in this chapter . . shall be construed to supersede or impair or othervi affect the
provisions of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, or any of the rights, bencft-, privileges
or immunities of any carrier, employee, organization, rcprczentative or pl.rzn cubjcct
thereto; nor shall anything contained in this chapter be construed .. . to impair or other-
wise affect the rights of any person under the National Labor Relations Act, as amcndcd"
145. See authorities cited in note 78 supra.
146. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953); fee dLct_-ion accom-
pan.ing notes 73-75 supra.
147. Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, 337 US. 521 (1949); fee discut:Jon accompanying
note 76 supra. Compare Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151, 167
(1957).
148. E.g., Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 413 (1927); Adlins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (191); Adair v. United State:,
203 U.S. 161 (1903); Lochner v. New York, 19S U.S. 45 (1905).
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decisions have since been overruled, 149 and the approach of strict con-
finement of governmental authority represented by some of the earlier
cases has been abandoned in favor of a strong presumption of the
validity of legislation. 5 ° But this has not diminished the importance
of judicial review. On the contrary, the Court developed a ndw phi-
losophy placing major reliance upon the restraints of the political proc-
esses acting through free discussion and the ballot for the protection of
individual rights.' 5 ' Under this approach, developed in large part under
the leadership of Chief Justice Stone, 5' judicial intervention was called
for where the political processes themselves were restricted, as by
limitations on freedom of expression 15 3 or on voting rights, 15 4 or where
they could be expected to be clearly inadequate, as where state action
affects interests outside the state, 5" or where there is discrimination
against discrete racial or religious minorities.5 0 This philosophy does
149. E.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117-18 (1941), overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart, supra note 148; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overrul-
ing Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra note 148; cf. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson,
351 U.S. 225 (1956), illustrating the complete reversal of Adair v. United States, supra note
148.
150. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525 (1949).
151. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); cf.
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 406 (1938).
152. Dowling, The Methods of Mr. Justice Stone in Constitutional Cases, 41 Colum.
L. Rev. 1160 (1941). See also Konefsky, Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court 195-
215 (1945); Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 511-35 (1956); cf. 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 1080 (1958).
153. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960) ; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) ; Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684 (1959); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380 (1957); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
154. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
See also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S.
58 (1960).
155. See explanations by Chief Justice Stone in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761, 767-68 n.2 (1945); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45-47
n.2 (1940); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); South Carolina Highway Dep't
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2 (1938). See also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U.S. 520 (1959); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 434 (1946); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941); cf. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125 (1890).
156. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
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not necessarily place any constitutional rights in a "preferred posi-
tion""' over others; rather, the approach developed by Chief Justice
Stone has been applied in the substantive interpretation of the mean-
ing of broad provisions of the Constitution, such as the due process
clauses.
If this philosophy is brought to bear in determining what rights are
inherent in the duty of fair representation imposed in Stcle, it is clear
that all employees must be granted the right to free expression and the
right to vote for officers of their bargaining agents, subject only to reas-
onable requirements (e.g., paynent of dues) imposed without undue
discrimination.""5
Laws enacted by a legislature elected under discriminatory suffrage
requirements have not been held invalid for that reason. Relief has been
confined to barring discriniination in the future. Similarly, several cases
have quite wisely held that an existing collective bargaining agreement
may not be impeached for lack of prior notice to employees, or of em-
ployee opportunity to participate.1 O Furthermore, section 403 of the 1959
act makes the remedy provided in the act the exclusive means of challeng-
ing an election already conducted."' The remedy left open to enforce
rights inherent in the duty of fair representation is therefore chiefly an
injunction requiring that employees represented by the union concerned
be permitted to vote in future union elections unless disqualified for
reasonable cause.
It may be argued that the requirement that internal union remedies be
exhausted would make it difficult to secure pre-election relief in advance
of the actual election. However, section 403 clearly contemplates that
pre-election relief is possible, since it explicitly pre-empts only the field
337 (1938); of. Truax v. Raich, 239 US. 33 (1915); Yicl: Wo v. Hoplin, 113 U.S. 35
(1836) (aliens). See Givens, The Impartial Constitutional Principle Supporting Brawn v.
Board of Education, 6 How. L.J. 179 (1960).
157. Sae Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 423 (1956); but Eea the concurring
opinion, id. at 439-40. See generally Cahn, The Firztness of the Firt Amendmcnt, 65 Ya1
LJ. 464 (1956).
158. The arguments which might sustain such a result even acide from the Vwidcr im-
plications of Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., developed in the firzt part of this article, are
presented in Givens, The Enfranchisement of Employees Arbitrarily Rcjcctcd for Union
Membership, 11 Lab. L.J. S09 (1960); cf. Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 1SLO, 159-10-
(1959).
159. Goodin v. Clinchfield R.R., 125 F. Supp. 441, 452 (E.D. Tenn. 1954), afi'd, 229
F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956); M r:hall v. Central of Ga. Ry.,
147 F. Supp. 355, 858 (SD. Ga. 1956); Cook v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Portcro, 36)
S.W.2d 579, 537 (Mlo.), cert. denied, 353 US. 817 (1953); Hudson v. Atlantic Co3ct Line
R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441, 450-51 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 949 (1956).
160. 73 Stat. 534, 29 U.S.C. § 4S3 (Supp. I, 1959). See text accompanying note 10
infra.
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of post-election relief. The exhaustion principle would seem to apply
only if the union itself provided a pre-election remedy, since otherwise
there would be no procedures dealing with the relief sought which could
be exhausted. Relief only after the election may be too late for many
purposes and is contemplated as a different question by section 403.
The exhaustion-of-internal-remedies principle should not be permitted,
as a procedural principle, to bar otherwise existing substantive relief."0 1
In order to assure adequate time for the exhaustion of any available pre-
election remedies within the union, and to allow time for adjudication of
any procedural issues which might arise, it would of course be prudent for
any action seeking pre-election relief to be considered well in advance of
the actual election involved.
Because of section 603(b), 6 2 the 1959 act appears to pose no obstacle
to the enforcement of the implications of Steele by a pre-election injunc-
tion. Interpretation of section 603(b) to permit enforcement of rights
of employees arbitrarily rejected for union membership would be in ac-
cord with the act's fundamental purpose, which is to protect the rights of
employees.
Even in the absence of section 603(b), the obstacles presented by sec-
tion 403 in title IV, regulating union elections, 163 do not seem insur-
mountable. It provides:
161. Compare as to the procedural doctrine of primary jurisdiction of administrative
agencies, Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 496-500 (1958); Note,
Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination,
58 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 689-94 (1958); Note, The Isbrandtsen Decision: Anti-trust Laws,
Regulated Industries and the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 803,
812-13 (1959).
162. 73 Stat. 540, 29 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. I, 1959).
163. The same principles discussed in connection with § 403 apply equally to § 401(e),
which provides in part: "The election shall be conducted in accordance with the constitu-
tion and bylaws of such organization insofar as they are not inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this title." 73 Stat. 533, 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (Supp. I, 1959). This provision,
being part of title IV, would not seem able, under § 603(b), to override rights otherwise
available under the RLA or NLRA, including rights under Steele. Such a construction would
be in accord with the fundamental purpose of the 1959 act to protect employees as expressed
in § 2.
Section 401(e) also provides that "Each member in good standing shall be entitled to
one vote." This provision is affirmative and does not deal specifically with whether others
may vote if arbitrarily excluded from membership although represented by the union In
question. It appears to be designed to preclude the possibility of weighted voting. How-
ever, in any event, as a part of title IV, it should not limit rights under the RLA or NLRA
and therefore under Steele if § 603(b) is held to apply, as it should be in view of the
purposes expressed in § 2.
In Byrd v. Archer, 45 L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D. Cal. 1959), the court held that the right
to run for union office under § 401(e) could not be enforced by injunction in the federal
courts when title IV, including §401, was not in effect as to the union in question. The
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No labor organization shall be required by law., to conduct elections of officers vth
greater frequency or in a different form or manner than is required by its own consti-
tution or bylaws, except as otherwise provided by this title. Existing rights and
remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization with respect
to elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the provisions of
this title. The remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already con-
ducted shall be exclusive.'C"
Since voting rights for those arbitrarily excluded from membership
would not be provided by the constitution or bylaws of the union in most
cases, a suit claiming such rights would not fall within the second sen-
tence of section 403. On the other hand, if brought prior to the election,
it would not fall within the ban of the third sentence. Therefore the
question, in the absence of section 603(b), would become whether "who
may vote" is within the "form or manner" of conducting elections as
used in this section.
Section 603 (a) provides: "Except as explicitly provided to the con-
trary, nothing in this Act shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of any
labor organization ... under any other Federal law .... "16 The "form
or manner" of conducting elections might refer to such matters as the
time and place of voting, number of inspectors, method of counting bal-
lots, majority required for election, and similar matters, or might be
given a broader sweep to include such matters as who may vote. Because
of this ambiguity, the section should not be viewed as "explicitly" inter-
fering with rights based upon the concept of fair representation, particu-
larly in view of the act's fundamental purpose of protecting employee
rights. Therefore, rights based upon Steele should not be limited even
aside from section 603(b).
We have concluded that access to participation in collective bargain-
ing decisions, subject only to qualifications having some minimum con-
nection with legitimate union principles, must be granted to all em-
ployees represented by the union. Three routes have brought us to this
court's further statement that even if title IV had been in cffcct the remedies cp,-dlcd in
§ 402 are exclusive, was clearly dictum, and in any event did not deal with rights under
the NTLRA or RLA, which are preserved by § 603(b). Furthermore, it is contrary to
the approach adopted in Mitchell v. Robert Delario Jewelr.y, Inc., 361 U.S. 2,3, 2 -91
(1960). The court's suggestion that even if title IV had bzen in effect the court would
have lacked jurisdiction to enforce the ban of § 401(e) on arbitrary denials of the right
to run for union office because of lack of a specific jurisdictional grant is, in addition,
contrary to the position taken in Leedom v. Kyne, 35S US. 124 (195S). There it was faid
that a statutory command itself creates federal question jurisdiction by virtue of 23 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1958), which confers general jurisdiction on the federal courts in carcs ariing
under laws regulating commerce. See also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); Mulford v. Smith, 307 US. 3S, 46 (1939).
164. 73 Stat. 534, 29 U.S.C. § 4S3 (Supp. I, 1959).
165. 73 Stat. 540, 29 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. I, 1959).
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point: interpretation of section 3(o) to effectuate the purposes expressed
in section 2, application of constitutional precedents under the due
process clauses, and application of the concept of fair representation
established in Steele. We now consider the reasonableness of this result.
4. The Reasonableness of the Result
One of the grounds of attack upon the discriminatory contract in
Steele, was that Negro employees were barred from membership and given
no notice or opportunity to be heard concerning the Brotherhood's plans.
Chief Justice Stone said:
While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor organization the right to
determine eligibility to its membership, it does require the union, in collective bar-
gaining . . . to represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. Wherever necessary to
that end, the union is required to consider requests of non-union members of the
craft and expressions of their views with respect to collective bargaining and to give
to them notice of and opportunity for hearing upon its proposed action.100
The right of a union to determine eligibility to its membership has
great historical momentum behind it, because it has always been re-
spected in the past and because many unions derive from fraternal orders
which had many social functions in addition to collective bargaining. It
has practical significance in permitting the union to protect itself from
persons seeking to join only to disrupt, perhaps sent by a rival union,
an employer, or a political faction seeking to dominate the union.'
The right of those arbitrarily excluded from membership to partici-
pate in collective bargaining decisions also has a great tradition behind
it, made applicable by the analogy between private and public govern-
ment. This is the tradition exemplified by the principle stated in the
Declaration of Independence that governments derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed, and by the constitutional protection
afforded the right to petition for redress of grievances'08 and to have the
expression of one's views considered through the ballot without arbitrary
discrimination. 1 9 These principles also have practical force behind
them, for experience has taught that the power to govern, be it the
public power of official government or the power of "private govern-
ments," if it is not to be abused, must be limited by representation of the
governed and their right to be heard. The precise manner of reconciling
166. 323 U.S. at 204.
167. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); ef. 105 Cong.
Rec. 6721 (1959).
168. U.S. Const. amend. I.
169. See cases cited in note 154 supra; U.S. Const. amend. XV (barring discrimination
in voting on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude) ; U.S. Const. amend.
XVII (direct election of Senators); U.S. Const. amend. XIX (woman suffrage).
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these competing principles and practical needs, each rightfully entitled
to respect, was not spelled out in detail in Steele. The opinion did, how-
ever, indicate an avenue of approach which appears to be sound and in
accord with the results reached under our-suggested interpretation of sec-
tion 3(o), under the due process clause, and under the emphasis on the
freedom of the political processes emerging from constitutional decisions.
A union's privilege to set its own qualifications for actual membership
would be preserved, but an obligation would be imposed to consider the
views of others in making collective bargaining decisions. Considera-
tion of the views of those arbitrarily excluded from membership would
be assured by requiring that those rights specified in the act which are
inherent also in the political restraints relied on in constitutional deci-
sions be available to employees who apply for membership but are
excluded on grounds not having some minimum connection with union
purposes. A union would retain the power of complete exclusion from
its processes where it could show grounds having some connection with
its objectives.
Some might argue that it would be preferable to enact a statute requir-
ing unions to admit to membership all employees represented by the
union, subject to reasonable qualifications.' But in the absence of such
a statute, the question must still be faced whether employees who apply
for union membership and are rejected without good reason may be en-
tirely excluded from taking part in collective bargaining decisions. The
use of the term "requirements" in section 3(o), the constitutional ob-
jections to making federal rights dependent upon private discriminatory
action, and the implications of the Steele case each indicate that the
answer to this question should be "no."
Guarantees of the individual right to participate will not assure the
end of corruption or racketeering,17' any more than such rights have
prevented corruption from arising in public government. However, dem-
ocratic rights will permit reform movements to gain power if and when
employees become dissatisfied with the conduct of their representa-
tives.172
170. See American Ciil Liberties Union, A Labor Union Bill of Rights (1952 & 195s);
Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Hr. L. Rc. 351,
S60-61 (1960); Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Cornel L Q.
25, 53 (1959); Meltzer, Some Introductory Observatiors, 35 Notre Dame Law. 595, C92
(1960); Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 Lab. LJ. .74 (1957);
Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 Colum. L. Rrv. 33 (1947).
171. Hays, The Union and Its Memnbers: The 1ses, of Dcraeocracy, in NX.YU. 11th
Conf. on Labor 35-3S (195S).
172. Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Thcir Own Choosing 17-19 (1957); cf. Taft,
Opposition to Union Officers in Elections, SS Q.J. Econ. 246 (1944).
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Furthermore, democratic rights will not prevent a majority from flout-
ing the interests of a minority who can be outvoted even though granted
the right to vote.'73 However, realization that the votes of even a small
minority may be decisive against the incumbents in some future contro-
versy'74 will assure that the minority is not treated so harshly that
wounds will remain to prejudice the leadership. The rights to free ex-
pression and the ballot also help to insure that a majority cannot be ex-
ploited by a dictatorial minority which has gained power and proposes to
act without regard for other minorities not in office who together amount
to a majority.17 5
Finally, no amount of democratic rights can prevent apathy or lack
of interest, but the opportunities they provide may eventually lessen it.
Individual rights cannot provide absolutely equal participation for all,
because this is simply not practicable . 7  But the opportunity to partici-
pate can be kept open, and with the opportunity open, grass roots partici-
pation may gradually grow, particularly in local matters delegated to
local decisions rather than centralized in distant offices. 77
173. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a
Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1356-57 (1958); cf. Stone, Law and Its Administration
130 (1915).
174. See Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy 586 (1941); H-ermens,
Democracy and Good Government 10 (1943); McLaughlin, Political Processes in American
National Student Organizations 1-10, 76 (Ph.D. Thesis, Notre Dame, 1948).
175. McLaughlin, op. cit. supra note 174, at 1-10, 76; Quincey, The Protection of Ma-
jorities (1876). Compare Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties in Labor Unions, 8 Lab. L.J.
874, 875 (1957).
176. Lippmann, Public Opinion, chs. XIV, XV (1922); McLaughlin, op. cit. supra note
174, at 4-8; Michels, Political Parties 401 (1949). See Lipset, Trow & Coleman, Union
Democracy 4 (1956); Magrath, Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union Demo-
cracy, 12 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 503 (1959).
177. See sources cited in note 261 infra; cf. De Huszar, Practical Applications of
Democracy (1945). The extension of these opportunities to participate to employees ar-
bitrarily rejected for membership who are represented by the union in question would
probably have its chief impact in such instances as those involving racial discrimination.
Most unions do not reject for membership employees willing to join and conform to the
union's reasonable requirements. Those which have restrictive membership policies usually
do so where union membership is essential to obtain work. See generally Summers, Ad-
mission Policies of Unions, 61 Q.J. Econ. 66 (1946); Summers, The Right to Join a Union,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 33 (1947). Where such job consequences flow from denial of membership,
Steele, as interpreted in Howard, may be violated. See note 71 supra. An unfair labor
practice may also be involved unless some exception is applicable or commerce is insuffi-
ciently affected. See National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(3), (b)(2), as amended, 61
Stat. 140, 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (3), (b) (2) (1958), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. I, 1959). See generally James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.
2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945); 8 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 234 (1951).
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C. The Usefulness of Intcrnzal Procedures
The rights guaranteed by the 1959 act or implicit in Steele will be far
more effective in promoting individual opportunity to participate in union
decisions if they are effectuated by the unions themselves and not merely
by outside coercion. The role of internal union procedures in enforcing
these rights is therefore of great importance.
Section 101(a) (4) of the act provides:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to im-titute an
action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency .... Pro-
vided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing proce-
dures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before
instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organization or any officer
thereof .... 1..
Neither this provision nor those conferring jurisdiction on the federal
courts to enforce rights guaranteed by the act'7 or implied under
Steele"' state when that jurisdiction should be exercised.
Although a member may not be required by the union to exhaust
remedies for more than four months, nothing prohibits the court in its
discretion from seeking further clarification from internal union tribunals
if such clarification would be useful and undue delay would not result.
For example, if a union member himself had caused the delay to exceed
four months by not diligently prosecuting his claim, or if the four-
month period expired immediately before the scheduled argument of
an appeal before union tribunals, the court might stay a suit for a
reasonable time to permit completion of internal procedures.
Two lines of precedents dealing with public government illustrate ju-
dicial power to delay exercise of jurisdiction in order to secure assistance
from another body with particular experience in the problem before the
court. The first series of cases apply the doctrine of "equitable absten-
tion" under which federal courts withhold the exercise of jurisdiction
pending resolution of state questions by the state courts when state law
is uncertain, where a federal constitutional question may be avoided by
clarification of state law, or where the exercise of jurisdiction would un-
necessarily interfere with state functions."' At the same time, it is clear
17S. 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (Supp. I, 1959).
179. E.g., Labor-'Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 §§ 102, 304, 402, 73
Stat. 523, 531, 534, 29 U.S.C. §§ 412, 464, 432 (Supp. I, 1959).
130. See 23 U.S.C. § 1337 (1953) and interpretations in Turutall v. Brothcrhood of
Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 3W, 4Gi (1939).
iSi. Harrison v. ACP, 360 US. 167 (1959); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v, Thibo-
daux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 US.S. SO
(1951); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); scz gcncrally Note,
Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 Colum. L. Iev. 749
(1959); Note, 69 Yale L.J. 643 (1960).
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that if state remedies prove inadequate or if unreasonable delay is en-
countered, the federal jurisdiction remains available to afford relief282
The second line of precedents apply the doctrine of "primary jurisdic-
tion," which requires that initial resort be had to an administrative
agency which has experience in or jurisdiction over the subject matter,
before the court will exercise jurisdiction.183 However, primary jurisdic-
tion does not apply where the facts and applicable law are so clear that
reference to the agency would not justify the delay.'84
Application of public government precedents to enforcement of rights
conferred by the 1959 act or implicit in Steele would suggest that the
court may delay exercising jurisdiction to await pending action by in-
ternal union tribunals where further classification would be helpful, but
should not do so where excessive delay or inadequate internal procedures
are found. A third series of precedents supporting the same conclusion
are those holding that unfair labor practice charges may be held in
abeyance in appropriate cases to await the result of private arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement if no undue delay results.18
Furthermore, decisions dealing with internal union affairs under state
law hold that internal remedies must be exhausted,"'0 but a well-recog-
182. See Harrison v. NAACP, supra note 181, at 178-79 (1959); Note, 59 Colum, L.
Rev. 749, 766-68 (1959); cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42 (1958).
183. United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426 (1907) ; see also Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 498-99 (1958);
see generally Von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine
of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 929 (1954) ; Note, Regulated Industries and the
Antitrust Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 689-94
(1958).
184. Public Utils. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958); Great No.
Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922). Cf. City of Chicago v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319 (1958).
185. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, 257 F.2d 467 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958); Beatty, Arbitration of Unfair Labor Practice Dis-
putes, 14 Arb. J. 180 (1959); Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices:
Jurisdictional Problems, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 52, 59-64 (1957); Samoff, The NLRB and
Arbitration: Conflicting or Compatible Currents, 9 Lab. L.J. 689 (1958); Note, 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 725 (1956); Note, 20 La. L. Rev. 767 (1960); Note, 69 Yale L.J. 309 (1959).
186. See Derling v. Di Ubaldi, 59 N.J. Super. 400, 157 A.2d 864 (Ch. 1960); Falsettl v.
UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960); Trainer v. International Alliance of Theatrical
Stage Employees, 353 Pa. 487, 46 A.2d 463 (1946) ; Montemuro, The Doctrine of Exhaustion
of Union Remedies, 2 Duke B.J. 148, 149-51 (1952). Under the 1959 act, see Tomko v.
Hilbert, 46 L.R.R.M. 2853 (W.D. Pa. 1960); Rizzo v. Ammond, 182 F. Supp. 456 (D.N.J.
1960); Smith v. General Truck Drivers, 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Flaherty v.
McDonald, 183 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Cal. 1960). But cf. Harper v. Gribble, 46 L.R.R.M.
2860 (Colo. 1960) (no exhaustion required where only damages were sought for wrongful
expulsion).
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nized exception applies where recourse to such remedies would appear
to be futile.' 5
7
The legislative history of the 1959 act indicates that the four-month
period of exhaustion of reasonable internal procedures specified in sec-
tion 101(a) (4) need not be exclusive. Indeed, Senator Kennedy stated:
Nor is it the intent or purpose of the provision to invalidate the considerable body
of State and Federal court decisions of many years standing which require, or do not
require, the exhaustion of internal remedies prior to court intervention depending
upon the reasonableness of such requirements in terms of the facts and circumstances
of a particular case. So long as the union member is not prevented by his union from
resorting to the courts, the intent and purpose of the "right to sue" provisien is ful-
filled, and any requirement which the court may then impose in terms of pursuing
reasonable remedies v.ithin the organization to redress violation of his Union consti-
tutional rights will not conflict vith the statute. The doctrine of exhaustion of rea-
sonable internal union remedies for violation of Union laws is just as firmly estab-
lished as the doctrine of exhausting reasonable agency provisions prior to action by
the courts.lss
A question as important as that of when exercise of jurisdiction should
be stayed pending an internal decision concerns the degree of finality
which can be accorded to internal union decisions.
Section 101 (a) (5) provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined except for nonpayment of dues . . . unless such member has been
(A) served with written specific charges; (B) given reasonable time to prepare his
defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.1'5
It would appear that if standards consistent with the act and with
Steele are applied, if the procedures are reasonable, and if the hearing is
full and fair, the objective of avoiding unnecessary interference with the
bargaining function which governed in Hzlhman 00 and Campbell19
should lend considerable weight to the conclusions reached, unless they
are clearly arbitrary." 2 On the other hand, if the standards applied are
insufficient or the procedure unfair, not only should little weight be
accorded to the conclusions, but no delay to the exercise of jurisdiction
would be justified.
187. Tdarchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 2S A.2d 051, 059 (1952); ONdl v. Unitcd
Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers & Steamfitters, 343 Pa. 531, 36 Aid 325 (1944); Montc-
muro, The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Union Remcdies, 2 Duae B.J. 140, 154-55 (1952);
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1337-3 (1951);
Note, 1954 Wash. U.L.Q. 440, 445 (1954).
188. 109 Cong. Rec. 16414 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
189. 73 Stat. 523, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (Supp. I, 1959).
190. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953).
191. Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, 337 US. 521, 527-29 (1949).
192. Compare Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Yaclaus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944); Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United Statcz, 3C3
U.S. 297, 303-04 (1937).
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Since the act does not specify what constitute reasonable procedures
or a fair hearing, it may be appropriate to turn to prior decisions as
guideposts. Several questions may be crucial, such as whether the right
of cross-examination must be accorded." 3 However, here we will con-
sider in detail only the requirement of the impartiality of the tribunal.
Reference of the dispute in Steele to the Railroad Adjustment Board
was rejected because representatives of the Brotherhood, which had a
direct interest in the outcome, took part in selecting the members of the
Board.194 In support of this conclusion, Chief Justice Stone cited Tumey
v. Ohio,'9" which held it a denial of due process to try a person before
the mayor of a city which would receive part of any fine imposed.
Where internal union proceedings take place before persons who are
directly connected with or personally involved in the dispute,""0 Steele
and Turney indicate that little weight can be accorded to the conclusions
reached. 197 Several avenues are open to overcome this defect.
One is suggested by the Public Review Boards"9 8 established by some
unions, which consist of impartial outside persons who act as an internal
judicial body to insure compliance with the individual rights guar-
193. On the general procedural requirements which would be necessary, only a few of
which are considered here, see generally American Civil Liberties Union, A Labor Union "Bill
of Rights" 6-7 (1958); Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy 264-64 (1959);
Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483 (1950); Summers,
Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1951); Taft, judicial
Procedure in Labor Unions, 59 Q.J. Econ. 370 (1945) ; Note, Procedural "Due Process" In
Union Disciplinary Proceedings, 57 Yale L.J. 1302 (1948); cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959) (right of cross-examination of accusing witnesses); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950) (notice and opportunity to be heard).
194. 323 U.S. at 206. See cases cited in note 46 supra.
195. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
196. See Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy 264-65 (1959); Summers, The Law
of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 Yale L.J. 175, 204-05 (1960).
Cf. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1082-83
(1951).
197. A similar problem, that of the great influence often exerted upon regulatory bodies
by those regulated, has caused great concern in the application of such doctrines as
primary jurisdiction and the conclusiveness of administrative determinations even in the
field of public government. See Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process:
A Reevaluation, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1107-13 (1954); Note, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 678
(1958); 58 Colum. L. Rev. 115, 117-18 (1958).
198. See News Developments, 39 J,.R.R.M. 39, 41 (1957) (UAW); 1959 UAW Pub. Rev.
Bd. Ann. Rep.; 1958 UAW Pub. Rev. Bd. Ann. Rep.; see also News Developments, 34
L.R.R.M. 65 (1954) (Upholsterers Union); see generally Stieber, Oberer & Harrington,
Democracy and Public Review (1960); Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor,
58 Mich. L. Rev. 55 (1959); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation:
Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1349 (1958); Note, Public
Review Boards: A Check on Union Disciplinary Power, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1959).
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anteed by the union's constitution. So long as it is clear that truly im-
partial persons are in fact appointed to serve on such boards, and where
the standards applied under the union constitution measure up to those
which a court must apply under the 1959 act and under Steele, their
conclusions should be given great weight.' They should not be given
the complete conclusiveness often accorded the decisions of arbitrators, -110
however, since even with safeguards it is difficult to insure the complete
impartiality of tribunal members appointed by those whose action is to
be reviewed. The weight accorded to determinations of reasonableness of
administrative agencies might form a better analogy. -1
A second avenue of approach could be arbitration itself? " This need
not be impractical if an arbitration system is provided for by the union
as part of its judicial process, as a Public Review Board has been by some
unions. A union could properly require the individual employee to ac-
cept arbitration provided he retained the power to nominate or object to
particular arbitrators with the same effectiveness as the union, with an
impartial body to break any deadlock, since procedure would not preju-
dice his right to a fair and impartial hearing.
A third approach which might be less expensive is suggested by the
practice in many industries of appointing permanent umpires to arbitrate
disputes between unions and management. A permanent umpire for a
grievance procedure within the union would be similar to the procedure
of a Public Review Board, except that a joint internal arbitration system
might be maintained by more than one union, for example, with umpires
apportioned geographically to act for several unions and thus save costs
for each. A precedent for such joint action among several unions already
exists in the AFL-CIO Codes of Ethical Practices and the No-Raiding
Pact20
199. See Oberer, The Impact of the Labor-Management Reporting and Didsl:ure Act
of 1959 on Internal Union Affairs, 11 Lab. L.. 571, 574-76 (19C0).
200. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Whcel & Car Co., 363 US. 593 (19L0);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Stedworers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U S, 443
(1957); Cournoyer v. American Television & Radio Co., 249 Minn. 577, 83 N.%IV2d 4G?
(1957); Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 14S N.E.2d 129, 170 N .2d 735 (1953), 53
Colum. L. Rev. 903. See Note, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 153, 171-73 (1959).
201. See cases cited in note 192 supra.
202. See Williams, The Political Liberties of Labor Union Member, 32 Texas L. Rev.
826, 836-38 (1954); Excerpts, Address by Walter Gellhorn, 40 L.R.R.M. 90, 92-93 (1957);
cf. Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy (1959); Note, Judicial Intervention in
Revolts Against Labor Union Leaders, 51 Yale L.J. 1372, 13,0 (1942); compare ATC
Agency Resolution Investigation, CCH Av. L. Rep. II 222S2, at 14531, 14535 (CAB June
10, 1959).
203. See Hutchinson, The Constitution and Government of the AFL-CIO, 46 Calif. L.
Rev. 739 (1953); N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1959, p. 1, col. 2. Aside from the ueefulnczs of such
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In order to secure finality, and lessen the need for judicial scrutiny of
the impartiality of the tribunal in each particular case, it might be
possible to develop standards for the selection of members of such an
internal judiciary, such as a minimum term of office and lack of prior
position in the appointing unions or related organizations for a specified
period. Also, the appointing unions might provide machinery requiring
confirmation of the nominees by an outside impartial body such as a
federal court, the Secretary of Labor, or an appropriate neutral private
body.20 4 If these appear to be onerous requirements for a union to ac-
cept, it must be remembered that the only alternative under the act and
Steele is full judicial review of the merits of each case, with the con-
clusions reached by internal procedures receiving little conclusiveness
because of the considerations pointed out in Tumey and Steele.
An independent internal judiciary within the trade union movement
would lessen the necessity for outside intervention,205 and the very ex-
istence of such an internal judiciary might exert a beneficial effect of
even greater significance than the decisions in cases coming before its
tribunals.0 6
The degree of impartiality of internal tribunals may properly be given
an arrangement in dealing with cases arising under the 1959 act or the Steele principle,
an agreement between unions to abide by a plan of arbitration of internal grievances might
be enforceable under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1958), which confers federal jurisdiction in "suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization . . . or between any . . . labor organizations. . . ." A
precedent for such enforcement may be the enforcement of the "No-Raiding Pact" in United
Textile Workers v. Textile Workers, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958), and Local 2608, Lumber
Workers v. MilImen's Local 1495, 169 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1958). Contra, International
Union of Doll & Toy Workers v. Metal Polishers, 180 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1960). The
problem of interference with NLRB jurisdiction involved in the enforcement of the No-
Raiding Pact, discussed in 59 Colum. L. Rev. 202 (1959), and in Meltzer, The Supreme
Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations II, 59 Colum. L. Rev.
269, 295-301 (1959), would not arise in the case of an agreement to abide by machinery
for resolving internal grievances. Since the agreement would be between international
unions as in the No-Raiding Pact case, the question of the applicability of § 301 to suits
for breaches of contracts between entities within a single international union as In
Burlesque Artists Ass'n. v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 42 L.R.R.M. 2818 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), 69 Yale L.J. 299 (1959), would not arise. Enforceability might have important
advantages in promoting the stability of the arrangement, since expulsion from the AFL-
CIO has not proved an effective remedy.
204. Any private body utilized would have to be one whose independence, Impartiality
and devotion to the protection of employee rights was beyond question, if the problems
encountered in Steele and Tumey are not to weaken reliance upon the conclusions of a
tribunal appointed or confirmed by it.
205. Cf. Summers, The Role of Legislation in Internal Union Affairs, 10 Lab. L.J. 155,
159 (1959); Oppenheim, Trade Union Democracy, 1 Duke B.J. 234, 248 (1951).
206. 1959 UAW Pub. Rev. Bd. Ann. Rep. 20-22, 25-26; 1958 UAW Pub. Rev. Bd. Ann.
Rep. 2, 17.
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great weight in judicial review of the internal union decisions which are
reviewable under the LIRDA or under state law. Nevertheless, further
statutory amendments may be desirable if the objective of encouraging
an impartial internal trade union judiciary is accepted. Provisions which
would specify the considerations governing exhaustion of internal rem-
edies and the weight accorded internal decisions would permit unions to
rely upon these advantages if they sought to meet the prescribed stand-
ards of impartiality and effectiveness of internal procedures.
Such statutory amendments might provide that if one or more labor
organizations establish internal tribunals which qualify as effective and
impartial under stated standards, all claims of violation by the organiza-
tions of obligations toward their members or employees represented by
them, arising under state or federal law or by virtue of the organizations'
constitution or bylaws, must be initially presented to these tribunals for
decision. The courts would be empowered to review the decisions
reached and to afford relief in case of unreasonable delay, but decisions
of the qualified tribunals would be given great weight on review unless
arbitrary or not supported by substantial evidence.
Since the statute would explicitly provide for the conclusiveness of
internal decisions unless clearly arbitrary and for the exhaustion of in-
ternal remedies where there is no undue delay, a high degree of effec-
tiveness and impartiality should be required for a tribunal to be recog-
nized as qualified under these provisions. The discussion above and the
decisions in Steele and other cases imposing the requirement of impar-
tiality might form the basis for the standards for qualification. Such
standards might be formulated by an independent committee of outstand-
ing experts in the labor field who might also be charged with the respon-
sibility of confirming the nominations for membership on qualified tribu-
nals made by participating unions if it found the nominees truly im-
partial.
No union would be required to establish a qualified tribunal, but
those which did so, alone or together with other unions, would secure
the specified advantages of exclusive preliminary jurisdiction of the
internal tribunal and conclusiveness of its decisions. Qualification would
be withdrawn if the tribunal ceased to function or be effective and im-
partial in operation.
Such amendments might enable the purposes of legal standards for
the exercise of union power to be served more effectively, while at the
same time moderating the restrictive impact of these standards upon
union collective bargaining functions. Similar results may of course be
achieved under existing law if trade unions establish effective and im-
partial internal tribunals which are recognized by the courts as warrant-
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ing the accordance of greater weight to their decisions, and requiring
exhaustion of their procedures.
An important class of employee-union disputes which come before
internal tribunals as well as the courts consists of claims by individual
employees that their bargaining representatives have failed to process
meritorious grievances against employers. In Conley v. Gibson,20
the Supreme Court held that the duty of fair representation imposed in
Steele extended to the entire collective bargaining process, including the
processing of grievances. At the same time, the union has broad discre-
tion to settle grievances which it fairly considers to be without merit,
in order to administer the collective agreement effectively.0 8
Since under most collective bargaining agreements, arbitration is the
final step in the grievance procedure, and since arbitration agreements
have been held enforceable under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act 0°
in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 10 there appears to be no reason why,
in a proper case, a union could not be compelled to take a grievance to
arbitration.21 In fact, such a holding seems essential in view of many
decisions precluding an individual employee from pursuing separate
remedies because of an arbitration provision in the collective agree-
ment . 12  These decisions are sound, since they provide the union with
authority vitally necessary to its bargaining functions. But they mean
that the employee must be permitted to require the union to arbitrate a
grievance in a proper case if he is not to be left remediless.213 Yet if the
union is adverse to an employee grievance which is clearly justified and
not properly within the union's discretion to decline to process, the
Tumey problem may recur if the union selects some arbitrators as it
selected members of the Adjustment Board whose jurisdiction was re-
207. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
208. Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical Lodge
v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949) ; Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp, 782, 791
(D. Md. 1959) ; see Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Manage-
ment Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 635-36 & nn.10-11
(1959), and authorities cited.
209. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
210. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
211. See Note, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 153, 164-65 (1959); see also Blumrosen, Legal Pro-
tection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Auton-
omy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 658-62 (1959).
212. E.g., Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959);
see Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Cornell LQ. 25, 26-43
(1959); Note, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 153, 158-65 (1959). Cf. Arsenault v. General Elec. Co,,
147 Conn. 130, 157 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960).
213. Note, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 153, 163-65 (1959). The predicament in which the em-
ployee may find himself is illustrated by In the Matter of Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d
855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960).
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jected in Steele. In a similar situation, it was held that the court itself
must review the fairness of a settlement reached by the union through
an adjustment board."' 4 Accordingly, judicial review of the merits of
an arbitration award might be necessitated on the authority of Steele
where the problem of partiality in the tribunal exists. But this outcome0
would defeat one of the chief advantages of arbitration, namely, the
avoidance of litigation. Such an outcome might be averted if the union
permits the aggrieved employee to participate in the selection of an
arbitrator and allows an impartial body to participate in the union's be-
half if it cannot reach an agreement with the employee. A substitute arbi-
trator may be substituted for a permanent umpire unacceptable to the
employee."'a If that were done, judicial review of the merits of the
award would not seem required. This does not mean that the employee
must participate in selecting arbitrators in all or most cases, but rather
only where the grievance may have merit, where a serious conflict of
interests between the employee and the union exists, and where it is
desirable for the award to be final rather than subject to full review on
its merits.
D. The State Courts and State Law
The 1959 act confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce many
of its provisions. However, this jurisdiction is not exclusive except in
the case of the remedy for challenging a union election already con-
ducted.21 Therefore, the general rule that state courts may enforce
federal right applies.2 17 Similarly, since Steele itself arose from a state
court, it is obvious that the state courts have jurisdiction to enforce
rights implicit in the duty of fair representation.
In cases arising under the act or under the implications of Steele, the
state courts may of course enforce state as well as federal law so long
as it does not conflict with federal rights. Section 603(a) of the 1959
act provides that nothing in the act limits rights under state law except
214. Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), ccrt. dcnicd, 333 U.S. 035
(1949). Compare Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 3 Wis. 2d 264, 99 NXV2d 132 (1959), re-
hearing denied, 8 Wi1s. 2d 264, lCD N.W.2d 317 (1960).
215. See Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Managcment
Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 661-62 (1959).
216. Labor-'Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 §§ 402, 403, 73 Stat. 534,
29 U.S.C. §§ 482, 4S3 (Supp. I, 1959).
217. See note 47 supra. The implication which might be drawn from U.S. Dzp't of
Labor Interpretive Statement, Dec. 11, 1959, 23 U.S.L. Week 2294, that state courts have
no jurisdiction to enforce title I of the 1959 statute may be erroneous, Eince nothing
in the statute deprives state courts of their normal jurisdiction to enforce fcderal riht.
Compare McCarroll v. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1953), 5S Colum. L. Rev. 273, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1172.
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as explicitly provided.2 18 However, section 7 of the NLRA declares
that employees have the right to. organize and bargain, collectively,21
and section 9 provides for exclusive bargaining authority,220 which is
implemented by a requirement of bargaining in section 8.221 Enforce-
oment of state rules that would cripple the bargaining function would be
prohibited as contrary to these provisions.2 22 Therefore, the principle
of union authority exemplified by Huffman223 and Campbell 4 would
seem to be as binding on the state courts as the principle of union re-
sponsibility exemplified by Steele.
Section 701 of the 1959 act amends section 14 of the NLRA to permit
the NLRB to decline to exercise jurisdiction over industries having a
minimal impact upon interstate commerce. The amendment provides
that nothing in the NLRA "shall ...prevent ...any agency or the
courts of any State or Territory... from assuming and asserting juris-
diction over labor disputes over which the Board declines .. .to assert
jurisdiction.1 22 5  Since the state courts already had jurisdiction to en-
force the duties imposed in Steele, section 701 would appear to make
little change affecting the problems we are considering.
The substantive rule of exclusive bargaining upon which Steele is
based should not be affected, since the only change made relates to
jurisdiction, although there have been differing views as to whether this
carries with it displacement of federal substantive law.22 In any event,
section 603 (a) of the 1959 act provides that "Except as explicitly pro-
vided to the contrary, nothing in this Act shall reduce or limit the respon-
sibilities of any labor organization . . . under any other Federal
law ... 2217 Section 701 cannot be said to explicitly affect the rules to
be applied by the state courts under their jurisdiction to enforce Steele.
The jurisdiction of both state and federal courts is limited by the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB to prevent unfair labor practices,
including discrimination to encourage or discourage union member-
218. 73 Stat. 540, 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
219. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
220. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
221. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
222. Compare Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1945).
223. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
224. Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
225. 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. I, 1959).
226. See especially Papps, Section 701 and the State Courts: What Law To Be Applied?,
48 Geo. L.J. 316 (1959). See also Blumrosen, The New Federalism, In Symposium on
Labor Relations (Slovenko ed., to be published 1961).
227. 73 Stat. 540, 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Supp. I, 1959). See generally Comment, 28 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 737, 738-48 (1960).
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ship. 22' The exclusive jurisdiction of the Board, however, has been
confined to cases primarily concerning encouragement or discourage-
ment of union membership rather than internal union affairs. In Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,-  a union member was granted
reinstatement and damages for wrongful expulsion under state law.
The state court viewed the union constitution as a contract which
the union had breached by the improper expulsion. The Supreme Court
held that the state court had jurisdiction, on the ground that internal
union affairs were only remotely related to the concerns of the Taft-
Hartley Act.231 This statement, considered in the context of a case
challenging state competence on the ground of exclusive NTLRB juris-
diction, and in view of the Court's view that it is only NTLRB jurisdic-
tion which raises the problem of complete pre-emption of state juris-
diction -3' (as distinct from a bar to state action inconsistent with federal
rights), means that internal union affairs are peripheral to the Board's
concerns, not to the impact of the act as a whole as interpreted in
Steele.23 2 Viewed in this way, Gonzales establishes that neither state,
nor federal 3 judicial jurisdiction to enforce the implications of Steele
is ousted by the NLRB's limited authority in this field. -" :
E. Preserving the Bargaining Function
There are a number of provisions of the 1959 act whose consequences
may conflict with the purpose of the individual rights sections to pro-
tect the rights of individual employees.23 0 If restrictions on union ac-
223. See National Labor Relations Act §§ 3(a)(3), (b)(2), as amended, 61 Stat. 140,
141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 15S(a) (3), (b) (2) (195S), as amended, 29 US.C.
§ 153(a) (3) (Supp. I, 1959), as interpreted in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17 (1954). See also International Assn of Machinists v. Gonzalcs, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (195,)
(dictum).
229. 356 U.S. 617 (1953).
230. 356 U.S. at 621. See also id. at 619.
231. 356 U.S. at 619. See also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
243 (1959); Note, 69 Yale L.J. 309, 318 (1959).
232. See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurizdiction Over Labor
Relations I, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 6, 45-46 (1959).
233. Compare also Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U S. 192 (1944) (arking from
state court); cf. Railway lail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. SS (1945).
234. Compare Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. S92, reversing per curiam 223 F2d 739
(5th Cir. 1955); see Rives, J., dissenting, 223 F.2d at 745.
235. See Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 190, 193-201 (1959); compare San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 249 (1959) (concurring opinion). See the dis-
cussion of the difficulties created by excessively rigid mutual exclusivity of remcdies in
Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942), followed in Hahn v. Ro:.3 kLand
Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959).
236. Labor-lanagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 2, 73 Stat. 519, 29
U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. I, 1959).
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tivity had the effect of unduly hampering collective bargaining, indi-
vidual rights within the union would be to that extent valueless because
the union itself within which the rights were granted would have lost
its effectiveness to act on behalf of the employees. Similarly, if restric-
tions deter individual employees from taking part in bargaining functions
because of fear of *penalties or because they cannot understand the
regulatory requirements, the conferring of rights to participate will
become to that extent a largely empty ritual. And if a union's existence
is threatened, the urgency of unity to overcome such a threat would be
likely to hinder the achievement of greater individual freedom within
the union.
Such results would be contrary to the purposes of the individual rights
sections both of the 1959 act and of the National Labor Relations Act.
The presumption that the objectives of an earlier statute are not to be
deemed repealed by implication by a later one2 37 is particularly applica-
ble here, where these objectives are repeated in the statement of pur-
poses of the later legislation.2 38 There are ample precedents for deal-
ing with this kind of problem by construing the broad terms of a statute
to imply a rule of reason in its application.239 A rule of reason has
already been adopted, at least by the Secretary of Labor, in the applica-
tion of the bonding provisions of the act.240 One example may serve to
illustrate how this approach might be applied under the 1959 act.
Section 704(c) of the act adds a section 8(b)(7) to the NLRA ban-
ning recognition picketing "where the employer has lawfully recognized
in accordance with this Act any other labor organization and a question
concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under sec-
tion 9(c) of this Act . . .,24 This provision is designed to prevent a
237. E.g., FTC v. A.P.W. Paper Co., 328 U.S. 193, 202 (1946); United States Alkali
Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 206 (1945); United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
238. "The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it continues to be the responsibility
of the Federal Government to protect employees' rights to organize, choose their own
representatives, bargain collectively, and otherwise engage in concerted activities for their
mutual aid or protection. . . ." Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
§ 2(a), 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (Supp. 1, 1959).
239. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). "As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman]
Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in con-
stitutional provisions." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60
(1933) (Hughes, C. J.).
240. 29 C.F.R. § 453 (Supp. 1960); see N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1959, p. 14, col. 1.
241. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (Supp. I, 1959). The employer, however, cannot sue a union for at-
tempting to compel it to breach a collective bargaining agreement with another union.
Aacon Contracting Co. v. Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, 178 F. Supp. 129
[Vol. 29
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
union from applying pressure on an employer, and through him on his
employees, where another union representing a majority of employees
is already bargaining with the employer. Section 8(b)(7) does not
apply unless the existing union represents a majority, since otherwise
the employer could not validly recognize the existing union under the
terms of section 9(a) .242 The difficulty arises where no certification
election has been held. If it is not certain which of two competing
unions represents a majority, it becomes questionable whether the
existing recognition is in accordance with the act. If, as some state
courts have held,24 3 the very existence of a collective bargaining agree-
ment raises a presumption of the validity of the contract, a corrupt
or racketeering union could sign a contract with an employer and auto-
matically exclude a bona fide union until it had overcome the presump-
tion of validity by introducing proof. This is an extremely dangerous
possibility because of the widespread incidence of "sweetheart con-
tracts" designed for such purposes.214 To construe section 704(c) to
make "sweetheart contract" arrangements even more effective would
be to run directly counter to the purposes of the act stated in section 2
and to the principle against undue interference with legitimate union
functions. It would also be contrary to the right of employees to or-
(E.DIN.Y. 1959), afl'd, 276 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1960) (National Labor Relations Act § 301,
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1953), authorizes only suits between the contracting
parties).
242. "Representatives designated or selected . . . by the majority of the cmploycu: in a
unit appropriate for such purposes shall be the exclusive rcpre.cntativcs . . ." for collective
bargaining. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 61
Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1953). Certification folloing an NLRB eclction und.r
§ 9(c) is conclusive when invoked, but in its absence informal majority flcCtion appzars
to satisfy § 9(a) to the extent that if the union is truly rcprczntativC the cmployr may
deal with it without certification, as prior to the act. However, § 9(a) would appzar to
be violated if an employer bargained with a union which did not rprezent a majority of
the employees in an appropriate unit. See ILGWU v. NLRB, 2M0 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir.
1960), cert. granted, 364 U.S. 811 (1960) (No. 234, 1(O60 Term); Dixie Bcdding Mlfg.
Co. v. N,LRB, 268 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1959); District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 234 F2d 565, S69
(4th Cir. 1956); Statement of Secretary of Labor Mitchell, Hearings on S. 505 Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 8oth Cong-, l't scc.
407, 409 (1959), in IcDermott, Recognition and Organizatinal Picketing Undcr Amend-
ments to the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 Lab. L.J. 727, 731 (1%0); compare NLRB v. Drivers
Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), with Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S.
411, 414 (1960).
243. E.g., J. Radley Metzger Co. v. Fay, 4 App. Div. 2d 436, 16G N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st
Dep't 1957). The 'Metzger opinion rdied upon International Bhd. of Teamsters %,.
Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), but ignored the implications of Hill v. Florida, 325 US.
533 (1945), and appears to be contrary to Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 US. 131
(1957).
244. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1959, p. 1, col. 3, at 1, col. 4.
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ganize guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA,241 5 since that right could
then be exercised only after a long, uncertain and expensive proceeding
to prove that the existing agreement was invalid. The broad qualifica-
tion that an existing union must be "lawfully recognized in accordance
with this Act," therefore, should be interpreted to be satisfied only when
affirmative evidence of majority support is offered.24
Some protection of the right of recognition picketing is afforded by
section 10(l) of the NLRA, as amended by section 704(d) of the
1959 act, which precludes an injunction under section 8(b)(7) while
an unfair labor practice charge of employer assistance of domination
of the existing union is pending under NLRA section 8(a) (2). "I7 But
in the absence of such a charge, the implications of section 7 of the
NLRA and the purposes of the 1959 act should bar injunctions under
either state law or section 8(b)(7) based upon an existing bargaining
agreement where majority support of the union is not affirmatively
shown through NLRB certification or other expression of employee views
through secret ballot.248 Where a certification election is not practicable,
the NLRB might hold an advisory election249 or the court itself might
arrange for the conduct of a secret ballot referendum among the em-
ployees.2 50 Testimony, membership cards, depositions or similar evidence
should not be admitted to show majority status because the lack of se-
crecy might permit pressure upon employees which could alter the
result, contravening the policy underlying the secret ballot requirement
in certification elections.2 '
We have seen, then, how the recognition picketing provisions of sec-
tion 704(c) illustrate the potential conflicts which may arise between
possible interpretations of individual provisions of the act on the one
hand and the objectives of the act's individual rights sections and of the
245. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
246. Compare Jarvis Surgical Co. v. Davis, 15 Misc. 2d 1035, 186 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup.
Ct. 1958), 59 Colum. L. Rev. 810 (1959). See Givens, Section 301, Arbitration and the
No-Strike Clause, 11 Lab. L.J. 1005, 1015-17 (1960).
247. Where an unfair labor practice charge is dismissed because of the six-month statute
of limitations (see Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960)),
§ 10(1) might provide no further protection against an injunction under § 8(b)(7) even
though the contracting union did not represent a majority. However, the suggested Inter-
pretation of § 8(b)(7) itself would provide protection for the desires of the majority of
employees in such a case.
248. Compare Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
249. Cf. NLRB v. District 50, UMW, 355 U.S. 453 (1958).
250. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1959, p. 35, col. 2.
251. To the extent that the NLRB determines majority status other than by secret
ballot (see 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.22-.25 (Supp. 1960)), §§ 7, 9(a) of the NLRA, as given
specific meaning by § 9(c), would appear to be violated.
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NLRA on the other. However, if the act's stated objectives are allowed
to shape the interpretations, these conflicts will be minimized. The
extent to which conflicts will arise is difficult to predict in advance, 25-
but where conflicts emerge, the basic national judgments expressed in
section 2 should be given greater weight as probably a deeper expres-
sion of "the sober second thought of the community, which is the firm
base on which all law must ultimately rest,"2' 5' than any punitive pur-
pose which may have been translated into a particular provision.
The answers to many of the great questions under the statute, includ-
ing the position of employees arbitrarily excluded from union member-
ship, the role of internal union procedures, and others discussed herein,
must be reached through judicial reasoning based upon the fundamental
purposes of the act, rather than flowing unmistakably from the opera-
tive language of its provisions. In order to achieve the purposes
stated in section 2 of the act, the courts will be called upon to interpret
the many ambiguous provisions of the act in the light of an understand-
ing of industrial conditions and the basic aims stated in section 2. Al-
though this is a most difficult and perplexing task, we may draw encour-
agement from the fact that the Supreme Court has begun to develop
such an approach of purpose-interpretation based upon a recognition
of industrial conditions in cases under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 2  conferring jurisdiction over suits for violation of collective
bargaining agreements. -' z
III. THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE
The 1959 act and the implications of the Steele decision pose a mo-
mentous challenge for the trade union movement, for employers, for
individual employees, and for the public. How this challenge is met will
have far-reaching effects on our efforts to deal with the problems pre-
sented by concentrated power, and on the competition between demo-
cratic government and Communist totalitariansm.
252. Cf. Hays, Foreword, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1959).
253. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 25 (1936).
254. Compare Handler, Antitrust in Perspective, ch. I (1957); ece San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239-41 (1959); International As-s'n of M1acbinits
v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (195S); Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention,
40 Colum. L. Rev. 957 (1940).
255. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 135 (1953).
256. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (19C0); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (190); United Stcedworl:er v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 593 (1960); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp,
361 U.S. 459, 46S (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Ail, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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A. The Challenge to Trade Unions
The challenge to the union movement has two facets, one presented
by the individual rights sections of the 1959 act and by Steele, the sec-
ond by other provisions of the act.
The expanded individual rights which may flow from the act and the
implications of Steele present a historic opportunity to American trade
unionism. The rights which may be conferred are in accord with the
basic traditions of American trade unionism 257 and can offer several
crucial advantages to unions. First, the basic objective of unions of
securing greater participation for employees in decisions which affect
them will be better served. Second, dissatisfaction among employees
represented by unions may be transformed into constructive union
activity258 and criticisms will have an outlet which can lead to cor-
rection of the underlying conditions causing dissatisfaction. Third, to
the extent that individual participation grows, pressure for further dras-
tic legislation curbing union independence may be lessened and even
turned into opposition to such legislation. Fourth, organizing cam-
paigns should be assisted, since employees will be assured that their
rights will be protected. Fifth, if individual participation actually
expands, union standing before public opinion, with its long run politi-
cal consequences, will be greatly improved. To realize these advantages,
the opportunity to participate will have to be made real.25 9 For this
reason and because of the lessening of the need for direct judicial inter-
vention which might result, substantial benefits might flow from an
effective system of impartial internal tribunals or Public Review Boards
created by unions themselves. 260 Another important stimulant to indi-
vidual participation would be the decentralization of as many decisions
as possible to local units in which employees can take a more active
part.26' Of course, neither of these measures nor any others can achieve
257. See Goldberg, The Rights and Responsibilities of Union Members, 9 Lab. L.J. 298,
299 (1958); AFL-CIO Constitution, art. II, § 10; Code VI, Union Democratic Practices,
in AFL-CIO Codes of Ethical Practices 41 (1957).
258. Compare Lipset, Trow & Coleman, Union Democracy 268-69 (1956); Kovner, The
Legal Protection of Civil Liberties Within Unions, 1948 Wis. L. Rev. 18, 19; Seidman &
Melcher, The Dual Union Clause and Political Rights, 11 Lab. L.J. 797, 808 (1960); 1959
UAW Pub. Rev. Bd. Ann. Rep. 20-22; cf. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (1949), dis-
cussed in Blumrosen, Legal Protection of Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Author-
ity Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 632-33 n.4 (1959).
259. Much progress has already been made. See sources cited in notes 198 and 258
supra.
260. See note 198 supra.
261. See Lipset, Trow & Coleman, Union Democracy 14, 69 (1956); Summers, The
Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 44, 46 (Supp. 1958);
cf. Caplow, Organizational Size, 1 Ad. Sci. Q. 484, 502-05 (1957); Parkinson, Parkinson's
Law 33-44 (1957).
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the impossible and transform a trade union into a model of theoretically
perfect democracy, with absolutely equal participation by everyone in
its decisions, any more than each of us participates equally in the deci-
sions of the most democratic public governments. It is possible, however,
for the opportunity to participate to expand so as to come closer to the
goal of a workable democracy in which the minority which actually
formulate decisions are ultimately responsible to the majority who are
affected by these decisions, and in which an organization is invigorated
by participation from the bottom up as well as direction from the top
down.2 2
Expanding individual participation may well be given greater stress
as part of a re-evaluation of the aims of the trade union movement,2
in which a greater voice for the employee in his industrial government
as well as the protection of his job rights20 4 and the traditional goals of
higher wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions would be
considered significant?6 5
It is tragic for the union movement that the individual rights provi-
sions of the 1959 act had to be enacted as part of a measure which
also included provisions relating to labor-management relations bitterly
opposed by the unions. Many unionists will condemn the statute and all
of its supporters in toto. They will not make the painful effort neces-
sary to separate the various facets of the act to determine which parts
are necessary, if perhaps unpleasant, medicine which will nonetheless
help to cure real ills, and which are simply part of a contest between
unions and employers carried over into the political arena. If the effort
can be made to make this separation, it may well be found that the "Bill
of Rights" provisions, if construed in the light of the principles laid down
in Steele and in Campbell and Huffman and in the light of the judicial
philosophy of reliance upon political restraints, will prove of ultimate
benefit rather than detriment to the trade union movements.
262. Cf. Acheson, Thoughts About Thought in High Places, N.Y. Time:, Oct. 11, 1959,
§ 6 (Magazine), p. 20 at S6-37.
263. Compare Tyler, A New Philosophy for Labor (1959).
264. See Perlman, A Theory of the Labor movement (1928); Blumrosen, Lcgal Pro-
tection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Auton-
omy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 651-53 (1959).
265. To the extent that this took place, it would become particularly clear that ex-
tension of governmental ownership of industry would be disadvantageous to labor. Under
government ownership, some employee political rights, in some instances collective bargain-
ing and almost certainly the right to strike, would be lost. As to political rights, ccz Act
of Aug. 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1143, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 11,i-k (1953); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Note, 45 Geo. LJ. 2,3 (1957). As to collcctive
bargaining, see City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 2C2G S.W2d 539 (1947); but
cf. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957). As to the right to strike, fee United States
v. UMW, 330 U.S. 25S (1947); Act of Aug. 9, 1955, 69 Stat. 624, 5 U.S.C. §§ l13p-q (1953).
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Most of the problems raised by provisions of the 1959 act other than
those dealing with individual rights are beyond the scope of this article.
But the individual rights provisions may form the basis of a persuasive
argument open to unions that the restrictive provisions should be inter-
preted reasonably so as not to impair collective bargaining and thereby
reduce the value of the individual rights conferred by the act.
B. The Effect Upon Employers
Some employers may find that as a result of rights granted to in-
dividual employees, unions become more active and energetic, and
grievances and demands which might otherwise lie dormant are vigor-
ously presented.20 6 On the other hand, wildcat strikes might be less
prevalent, because employees would be more fully represented in the
formulation of the original contract and therefore more likely to be
satisfied with the settlement at least for the time being.20 7 Furthermore,
unions which better represent employees will bring the real wishes of
the employees more to management's attention, perhaps resulting in an
improvement of morale. Employees may also come to share a greater
sense of participation in their "industrial government" through their
rights in the union, and therefore a greater sense of belonging and satis-
faction in their work. If so, and if a guarantee of retraining, substantial
severance pay or new opportunities for those who were displaced due to
technical advances were provided, employees might become more willing
to take part in the effective ordering of their work so as to produce more
efficiently and at the same time make their jobs as interesting as pos-
sible.268
C. The Opportunity for Employees
Any extension of the right to participate in union decisions would be
important in helping to make unions more effective guardians of indi-
vidual employee rights. However, the opportunity to participate has
little meaning unless employees accept the challenge it offers and take
the time and effort necessary to make it real. Greater participation can
be significant not merely in terms of its effects upon demands for changes
in wages, hours, and working conditions, but also in providing a greater
opportunity for work ultimately to become more meaningful. 206  Car-
ried down to the local level, participation would be expanded not merely
266. See Raskin, One Cost of Democracy, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1959, p. 25, col. 1.
267. Cf. Taylor, The Role of Unions in a Democratic Society, in Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Government Regulation of Internal
Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members (Comm. Print 1958).
268. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1959, p. 28, col. 7; id., Jan. 12, 1960, p. 14, col. 1.
269. Compare the ultimate hopes expressed in Gibran, The Prophet 27-31 (Pocket ed.
1955).
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in collective bargaining decisions, but in all aspects of the job. Rights
on the job would then be secured by a grievance procedure under the
collective bargaining agreement, and rights within the union by an
internal grievance procedure within the trade union, each providing
impartial determinations, thus securing to the employee the benefits of
"due process of law" in his industrial government as well as in his public
government.270
D. The Public Interest
Powerful private groups are inevitable in modern industrial society,
unless a totalitarian state is substituted in their stead, gathering all
power to itself. We have sought to deal with this problem in two ways:
first, by expanding governmental control, and second, by strengthening
new private interests to offset the old. We have considered the second
method far preferable when it can be used. Experience has shown that
private power can be a vital source of initiative and new ideas when
limited by the countervailing power of those affected by it. Thus unions
became necessary to balance the power of employers. Similarly, it is
now necessary to extend "grievance procedures" within the unions to give
a greater voice to individual employees.
A free, responsible and democratic trade union movement, with its
promise of employee partnership in the government of industry, is one
of our most important weapons in the contest with Communist totali-
tarianism. One of the most striking contrasts between a free society
and one dominated by a Communist or Fascist dictatorship is that in
the latter, free trade unions are stamped out. The health of the Ameri-
can labor movement has a vital bearing on how our economic and politi-
cal system is judged by the newly developing nations. These elements
in the world struggle for men's minds are at stake in the issue of whether
the 1959 act is construed so as to further the opportunities of individual
employees while not unduly impairing the bargaining function.
Chief Justice Stone's decision in Steele v. Lonsville & N.R.R. can
have tremendous significance both as a guidepost in the interpretation of
the statute to achieve its stated purposes and as a precedent for princi-
ples of far wider applicability. Chief Justice Stone's sensitivity to the
steady pressure of facts and events and his respect for the past as a
foundation to be built upon in meeting new problems remains an inspir-
ing example. His decision indicates that private groups possessing legis-
latively conferred authority may be held to the constitutional standards
applicable to the legislature itself in the exercise of the authority
granted.
The great principle that power implies responsibility toward those
270. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 312 (1924).
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affected by it is of course not limited to the obligations of collective
bargaining representatives. It is the underlying basis of much of our
economic legislation. And it has potential judicial application, in vary-
ing degrees, under all of the great enactments which express national
judgments that fairness be required, as well as under statutes confer-
ring powers upon private groups. 17 1
This great principle at the core of the Steele decision is the antithesis
of totalitarian forms of government, under which power may be exer-
cised over others without responsibility to them, and free from political
restraints which may check its excesses. We stand historically com-
mitted to this principle and are struggling to vindicate it as superior
for meeting human needs. In the end, it will also be more efficient
because it can command the allegiance of the free human spirit, which
the totalitarian principle cannot do. The problems arising in the inter-
pretation of the 1959 act and the implications of Steele in the labor
field are one chapter in the history of that enterprise.
271. Cf. Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1958) ; Berle,
Legal Problems of Economic Power, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 4, 7-11 (1960); Givens, Parallel
Business Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 5 Antitrust Bull. 273 (1960).
